




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INTRODUCTION

TO THE

SCIENCE OF CHINESE RELIGION.

A CRITIQUE OF MAX MÜLLER AND OTHER AUTHORS.

BY

REV. ERNST FABER,

RHENISH MISSIONARY IN CANTON.

*His laws our laws ; all honour to him done
Returns our own.*

MILTON, *Paradise Lost*, V.

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PREFACE.

THE work I present to the public does not need an excuse. The importance of the subject will be felt by all readers. That I, a practical missionary and a German, have ventured to undertake such a thing is owing to the great fault of so many able writers not having done it before. They, of course, could have given a very superior production, if they only had put their pens to the task. But, as it is, much is written on Chinese religion, on the religion of other nations and on religion in general, that betrays on every page a great want of clearness in method and somewhat confused notions in regard to religion. I hope my little book will do some good service in this respect. The Science of Religion is very important indeed. More harm than good will, however, be done, if it is not treated inductively in a true scientific spirit. We

want to learn what religion really is and not what any author pleases to tell us about it or how he may think it ought to be. Religion must, besides, be treated in a highly religious spirit. Those who venture to write on fine arts without a cultivated artistic feeling and taste must fail in their endeavours. To write on religion in an unreligious mood is wasting paper. If the author combines with it great learning, and his book is for this reason read, it gives offence in proportion to its unbecoming language. The work of on Buddhism, not to mention others, is an example of bad taste in this respect.

There are some writers who show a tolerable acquaintance with heathen religions, but betray astonishing ignorance in regard to the Christian religion. It is not sufficient to have read a few theological works or critical commentaries on the Bible; such give only an intellectual view of Christianity. We have to enter the inner sanctuary of Christian life to get a full understanding of what Christianity really is; only then we can judge fairly. I hope my work will recommend itself in this respect. I shall not boast of a well-trained intellect, nor of much learning, etc. I have done what I could in my circumstances. There is no large library at my disposal. The few authors quoted are not carefully selected from among many others, but happened

to fall into my hands, and other works, perhaps more suitable to my purpose, are unknown to me. My ideas have, however, always been ready before I used another author. The work shows that I have to disagree with most of the writers referred to, but this deviation of opinion, or in some cases of principles, does not interfere with the respect and obligation I feel to the merits of those authors. As I suppose that most of the readers of this book will be residents of China living under the same disadvantage regarding the use of libraries, I have given a few quotations somewhat longer than I myself would prefer. But though eight or ten pages more are added to the book, it saves the trouble to those who have the authors, of wasting time in searching for the passages, and those who have them not will be glad to read such passages.

The reason that I have written in English and not in German, my native language, is that a part of this work has been written for and read at the Conference of Missionaries in Canton. It is a great disadvantage to me that I have to write in three languages. Most of my time and strength is yet devoted to Chinese studies and Chinese work. The German language I have far more in my power than the English, yet English has for such subjects the great advantage of wider circulation. As I have spent the best years

of my life among the Chinese in a country-station, I have not had much opportunity for cultivating English composition. I hope, however, that my style is at least intelligible and readable. In some respects it would have been better to defer publication till my work on Chinese Religion is completed. As, however, this Introduction has a more universal scope there can be no objection to a separate edition of it. The hearers of my two lectures expressed their wish to see what they heard in print. Rev. R. H. Graves, M.D., has been so kind to revise the sheets, and Mr. Geo. Murray Bain of the *China Mail* office has done me the great favour of reading the proofs. I hope sufficient buyers will turn up to pay the expenses. I have already convinced myself that to publish books in China or on Chinese matters is a somewhat costly pleasure. If, however, any good service is done by this publication to my fellow-labourers, and perhaps to other persons interested, such uncomfortable considerations will subtract nothing from the joy in having performed this task. I myself have had already the great profit of giving some definiteness to my own ideas in writing these chapters, and I hope this is an inestimable preparation for some works I intend to write in Chinese for the enlightenment of this numerous race which is as yet overshadowed by the darkness of Hades.

My sincere wish is, that the Lord may bless the little book to all readers, and especially induce many to be more earnest in their own Christian religion. We are yet far behind the ideals of the religion embodied in Christ. Many social evils and private bad habits are in striking contradiction to the clear meaning of the Gospel. Yet our belief is to overcome the world, *i.e.* is to become master over everything which is against God's plan. Love and peace in the mind and in the world—such is the Kingdom of Heaven.

E. F.

CANTON, August 2nd, 1879.

1847
The first of the year was a very
successful one for the
company. The sales were
very large and the
profits were very
large. The company
was very successful
in all its
operations.

25th Dec
The company was
very successful
in all its
operations.

INTRODUCTION.

“The Chinese,” Mr. Fairbairn* writes, “may be selected as a contrast to the Hebrew and the Teuton. They are a people singularly deficient in the religious faculty. They are a gifted race, ingenious, inventive yet imitative, patient, industrious, frugal. Their civilization is ancient, their literary capacity considerable, their classics receive an almost religious reverence. But this people has a so attenuated religious faculty or genius, that it can hardly be said ever to have known religion (!), at least as Semitic and Indo-European peoples understand it. Their notions of deity are so formless and fluid that it can be argued, just as one interprets their speech, either that they are theists or atheists.

* *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, and History* : 1877, p. 310.

“They reverence humanity as typified, not in the endless promise and hope of the future, but in the completed characters and achievements of the past. Their piety is filial, their worship ancestral. There are, indeed, three established religions, but, not to speak of an advice to have nothing to do with any one of them given by a late emperor to his people, two would hardly be classed as such in any other country than China, while the third is a religion imported from India, and so depraved by the change that the Buddhism of the civilised Chinese stands beneath that of Tartary and Thibet.”

This one quotation, taken from the recent work of an accomplished and erudite author, may suffice for many of a similar character. Most of the writers on China state that the Chinese are not a religious people, that they are indifferent to all religious creeds. Such vague assertions are commonly far from the truth. I, from my own observations, feel inclined to maintain that the Chinese belong perhaps to the most religious people (Acts xvii., 22, original) of the world. Only we must not look for any symptoms of religion similar to those to which we are accustomed in Christian lands. There are however, comparatively, more temples and altars, more idols and more religious practices in China than in almost all other countries.

The whole public and private life is impregnated by religious observations; we see every important action of the government, as well as almost every movement in private life, inaugurated by different religious rites.

It is my purpose to investigate scientifically the Chinese religion. Such an undertaking is different from a description of the religious practices of the present time.

Religion has in China, as everywhere, its history. We shall have to trace, as far as possible, every religious practice to its origin, show the connexion between the present and the past, and explain, as far as possible, the symbolical forms from their original ideas which they too often have only preserved in a petrified state. I, as a missionary, want to understand the religious state and condition of the people I have to deal with, just as a physician must know the nature of a disease, its origin and development, in order to bring the organism again to the wished-for state of health. The task is not an easy one. What Max Müller says with regard to investigating other religions applies far more to the study of Chinese religion.

“Any one who has worked at the history of religion knows how hard it is to gain a clear insight into the views of Greeks and Romans, of Hindus and Per-

sians on any of the great problems of life. Yet we have here a whole literature before us, both sacred and profane, we can confront witnesses, and hear what may be said on the one side and the other. If we were asked, however, to say, whether the Greeks in general, or one race of Greeks in particular, and that race again at any particular time, believed in a future life, in a system of rewards and punishments after death, in the supremacy of the personal gods or of an impersonal fate, in the necessity of prayer and sacrifice, in the sacred character of priests and temples, in the inspiration of prophets and lawgivers, we should find it often extremely hard to give a definite answer. There is a whole literature on the theology of Homer, but there is anything but unanimity between the best scholars who have treated on that subject during the last two hundred years.

“ Still more is this the case when we have to form our opinions of the religion of the Hindus and Persians. We have their sacred books, we have their own recognised commentaries ; but who does not know that the decision whether the ancient Brahmans believed in the immortality of the soul depends sometimes on the right interpretation of a single word, while the question whether the Persians admitted an original dualism, an equality between the principle of Good and

Evil, has to be settled in some cases on purely grammatical grounds?"*

Much has been written on China and its religion, yet more has to be done fully to clear up the subject.

Investigation is, however, much easier now than it would have been some years ago. The science of comparative religion has made some progress, and I think it best to investigate the Chinese religion in the light of comparative religion. Not that I intend to compare the Chinese religion with other religions—other persons may be better qualified to do that. What I desire is to come to an adequate understanding of everything connected with religion in China, and so gain an idea of the fulness of religious life as it appears in its various forms. The results of the science of religion will prove a valuable help towards accomplishing the desired end.

Regarding the method I shall not presume to know nothing except my own ideas, but start honestly

* Max Müller, *Is Fetishism a Primitive Form of Religion?* MacMillan's Magazine, 1878. I cannot agree, however, with this quotation without some reservation. The confusion about religion and theology will be settled in Chapter III. Any attempt to solve religious problems "on purely grammatical grounds" shows a want of proper method.

from Max Müller's "Introduction to the Science of Religion."*

It will, however, soon become apparent, that, though on the same road to the same destination, we cannot walk along hand in hand on our way.

* *Four Lectures with Two Essays*: London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1873.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF CHINESE RELIGION.

I.

THE NATURE OF RELIGION.

It will be best to begin with a definition of the meaning we attach to the word *religion*. Max Müller says, p. 16, "It will be easily perceived that religion means at least two very different things. When we speak of the Jewish, or the Christian or the Hindu religion, we mean a body of doctrines handed down by tradition or in canonical books, and containing all that constitutes the faith of Jew, Christian, or Hindu. Using religion in that sense, we may say that a man has changed his religion, that is, that he has adopted the Christian instead of the Brahminical body of religious doctrines just as a man may learn to speak English instead of Hindustani. But religion is also used in a different sense. As there is a faculty of

speech, independent of all the historical forms of language, so there is a faculty of faith in man, independent of all historical religions. If we say that it is religion which distinguishes man from the animal, we do not mean the Christian or Jewish religion, we do not mean any special religion, but we mean a mental faculty, that faculty which independent of, nay in spite of sense and reason enables man to apprehend the Infinite under different names and under varying disguises. Without that faculty, no religion, not even the lowest worship of idols and fetishes, would be possible, and if we but listen attentively, we can hear in all religions a groaning of the spirit, a struggle to conceive the inconceivable, to utter the unutterable, a longing after the Infinite, a love of God."

Max Müller is quite correct in distinguishing the first view as religious conviction from religion itself. But I never should call his "second thing" religion in the proper sense of the word. He says, p. 18, "We mean a *mental faculty*, the faculty of perceiving the Infinite, in German *Vernunft*, as opposed to reason and sense, in English the faculty of faith, but confined to those objects only which cannot be supplied either by the evidence of the senses, or by the evidence of reason." This second thing would be worse than the first, which consists in *productions* of this faculty and perhaps in something more. To define religion as "a mental faculty" is as great a mistake as to define philosophy or the fine arts as mental faculties.

It is true without such faculties no reasoning nor perception of beauty would be possible. The faculty itself, however, is nothing but the subjective condi-

tion for those achievements, as there are objects needed besides. Max Müller could have said more correctly, religion is the apprehension of the Infinite, instead of calling it the faculty which enables man to apprehend, etc.

On p. 20, this faculty is called "a *power* independent of sense and reason, a power in a certain sense contradicted by sense and reason." We are however nowhere told how religion differs from superstition and how far religions can be comprehended by reason.

Max Müller further states that "we hear in all religions a groaning of the spirit, a struggle, a longing after the Infinite;" but neither a groaning, nor a struggle, nor a longing are religion; a love of God even is not *religion*, though *religious*; so is the fear of God, the hope of a future life, etc. We see here Max Müller going on from his faculty to an *impulse* or *motive power*, which is something very different, as faculty according to Max Müller's note (p. 21) expresses "the different *modes* of action of our mind," but a power is the cause of a certain action.

Faculty and power are (p. 21) left alone, and we are told that "comparative theology has to deal with the historical forms of religion, and theoretic theology to explain the conditions under which religion, whether in its highest or its lowest form, is possible; it gives an analysis of the inward and outward conditions under which faith is possible" (p. 22). We see here a confusion of faith (in dogmas) and religion, in spite of the precaution taken (p. 16) above referred to. The historical form of religion would, according to Max Müller's premises, be nothing but a development of the

religious faculty. To theoretic theology a rather ridiculous task is assigned if it has to show "the possibility of any religious form" as if there were no religious facts whatever. I suppose Max Müller wanted to say that theoretic theology attempts to explain the *why* of the existence of religion in so many forms; comparative theology, on the other hand, only states and compares these different forms. The specific difference between the two sciences may be said to be that comparative theology is more descriptive and historical (p. 132), stating the facts and their development; theoretic theology is scientific, showing the necessity of these facts. Each fact must be proved to be the effect of a certain cause, etc.

All the sentences, quoted from Max Müller, point, however, to one and the same mistake—that religion is nothing but a *natural outgrowth of the human mind*, or a development of the faculty for the Infinite. Though I grant that the human mind is organised for religion, and so far I agree with Max Müller's religious faculty, yet I think this faculty alone insufficient to explain the multifarious facts of religion.

Max Müller strangely appeals (p. 135) to "the rational and to the moral conscience" against some outgrowth of the religious faculty. Reason is, of course, a faculty, but what of morals? Max Müller has no other choice left but to create another peculiar faculty of the human mind for morals. There can be no doubt that morality is neither from the senses, nor from reason (logical laws), nor from religion. But why do we not hesitate to ascribe to reason a distinct faculty of our mind, but feel rather unwilling to allow the same

privilege to religion and morals? The answer is, the two latter are connected with our *will* and *free determination*, but reason, as the faculty of our intellect, has its peculiar and definite *laws* in itself, any deviation from which is unreasonable. There are no *such* laws either in morals, in religion, or in political and social life. Though we are accustomed to speak of moral laws etc., the term only expresses what *ought* to be done according to the idea of some persons, from which idea other persons allow themselves to differ more or less, perhaps even diametrically. The laws of physics (including chemistry etc.), mathematics and logic are materially different. Of the first two branches the term law* does not express what ought to occur, but what really occurs; law is there a definite formulation of the connexion of cause and effect, in mathematics of antecedence and consequence. Though the laws in logic are definite enough, yet reasoning is influenced by the compound human nature so much that the

* "In its primary signification, a 'law' is the authoritative expression of human Will enforced by Power. The instincts of mankind, finding utterance in their language, have not failed to see that the phenomena of Nature are only really conceivable to us as in like manner the expressions of a Will enforcing itself with Power. But, as in many other cases, the secondary or derivative senses of the word have supplanted the primary signification; and Law is now habitually used by men who deny the analogy on which that use is founded, and to the truth of which it is an abiding witness. It becomes therefore all the more necessary to define the secondary senses with precision. There are at least Five different senses in which Law is habitually used, and these must be carefully distinguished:—

First, we have Law as applied simply to an observed Order of facts.

Secondly—To that Order as involving the action of some Force or Forces, of which nothing more may be known.

Thirdly—As applied to individual Forces the measure of whose operation has been more or less defined or ascertained.

logical laws will never find their adequate expression by thought. We see besides a remarkable influence of language upon our thoughts. These remarks may suffice to show that Max Müller has not been very fortunate with his religious faculty. I even think that Max Müller has been carried to some of his well-known objectionable conclusions by this first proposition and the indefiniteness of his notion (Begriff) of religion (comp. p. 270 ff).

It is, however, not Max Müller alone who is so unsatisfactory in his explanation of the origin of religion. I must confess to have not yet met with a convincing solution of the problem. As proof I point to C. P. Tiele,* who rather evades our question by his definition of religion as "the relation between man and the superhuman powers in which he believes." Mr. Tiele adds in a foot-note that "this definition is by no means philosophical and leaves unanswered

Fourthly—As applied to those combinations of Force which have reference to the fulfilment of Purpose, or the discharge of Function.

Fifthly—As applied to Abstract Conceptions of the mind not corresponding with any actual phenomena, but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought necessary to our understanding of them. Law, in this sense, is a reduction of the phenomena, not merely to an Order of facts, but to an Order of Thought.

These great leading significations of the word Law all circle round the three great questions which Science asks of Nature, the What, the How, the Why:—

(1) What are the facts in their established Order?

(2) How—that is, from what physical causes—does that Order come to be?

(3) Why have these causes been so combined? What relation do they bear to Purpose, to the fulfilment of Intention, to the discharge of Function? (*The Reign of Law*, by the Duke of Argyll, p. 64, 65).

* *Outlines of the History of Religion*: London, Trübner & Co., 1877.

the question of the essence of religion. The powers are designedly not described as supersensual, as visible deities would thus be excluded. They are superhuman, not always in reality, but in the estimation of their worshippers." We shall speak more of the "relation." Mr. Tiele has nothing more to say, and the reader feels, in going through his book, as if he were in a museum where animals are well preserved, but where life—nature—religion itself—are not met with.

Far more interesting is A. M. Fairbairn in his "Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History," but though deep and suggestive we see nearly the same indefiniteness as in Max Müller.

Mr. Fairbairn says (p. 12), "Faith is not the result of sensations. Mind is not passive, but active in the formation of beliefs. The constitutive element is what mind brings to nature, not what nature brings to mind, otherwise no spiritual and invisible could be conceived." This would exclude all immediate (direct) action of mind upon mind or spirit upon spirit; the spiritual and Invisible thus conceived could be nothing but one's own mind. Such a proposition must be proved. We fully agree, however, with the first part of the statement that faith is not the result of sensation.

Mr. Fairbairn speaks (p. 13) against "a primitive revelation as a mere assumption, incapable of proof, capable of most positive disproof. Revelation may satisfy or rectify, but cannot create a *religious capacity* or *instinct*."

We have already spoken of this attempt to reduce religion to nothing but a subjective state of

mind. Of course the light is not light to us without eyes to perceive it. But what is the religious capacity or the instinct of the mind? Are they not perhaps themselves revelations? The question will be treated hereafter.

The religious capacity or faculty is again described differently by Mr. Fairbairn and by other writers. "The Epicurean held that fear had created the gods (p. 8).^{*} Hume tried to evolve the idea of gods out of the ignorance and fear that personified the 'unknown causes' of the accidents and eccentricities of 'Nature'—but "causes" presuppose reflection on causation, *i.e.* reason, and personification implies either abstraction or imagination or both; Hume would thus have been more correct to call reason and imagination the sources of any idea of God. "Dupuis, a French writer, held that all religions had their origin in a worship of nature pure and simple, and that *les Dieux sont enfants des hommes*. But he did not explain the one thing needing explanation, how and why man had begun to worship at all. . . . They all suppose that man was originally destitute of religious belief and that religion is derived from the *lower faculties* and passions of man."

We see that the assumption of a faculty of our mind for religion is rather old and of no service, because

^{*} Dr. Jos. Beck, "Encyclopaedie der Theoretischen Philosophie" says (§380), "Epicurus ought to have added 'hope' that those powers would determine human destiny. This Theory is, however, a thoughtless confounding of effect and cause. The feeling of dependency is *prius*, fear and hope are *sentiments*, which follow the reflexion on *conscious* dependency."—A. Trendelenburg is also defective in this respect; see *Naturrecht*, §171.

its signification is too general. Mr. Fairbairn is not satisfied, of course, with such low faculties ; he himself takes refuge in the highest faculties, *conscience* and *imagination*, p. 39. "Conscience knew of relation, dependent and obligatory, to Some One. Imagination discovered the Some One on whom the individual and the whole alike depended in the Heaven (or somewhere else). Neither faculty could be satisfied with the subjective (*why* not?), each was driven by the law of its own constitution to seek an objective reality. Conscience, so far as it revealed obligation, revealed relation to a being higher than self. Imagination, when it turned its eye to Heaven, beheld there the higher Being, the great Soul which directed the varied celestial movements and created the multitudinous terrestrial lives. Without the conscience, the life, which imagination saw, would have been simply physical; without the imagination, the relation which conscience revealed would have been purely ideal, the relation of a thinker to his thought, not of one personal being to another . . . Of course in terming these 'the faculties generative of the idea' we do not mean that they acted alone. No faculty can be isolated in action, whatever it may be as an object of thought. We only mean that these, for the time being the governing faculties of the mind, were the two from whose continued *instincts and actions* the idea of God rose into form."

Mr. Fairbairn here comes near to saying that it is human nature as such and not one faculty or two etc. But Mr. Fairbairn has to begin again his Sisyphus task. "In the oldest religion (p. 42) worship, sacrifice, prayer and such rudimentary ideas as faith, piety,

holiness can be discovered, and their existence implies, as their creative faculty, a *moral sense*" (see above). We require, therefore, a faculty, so Mr. Fairbairn says, generative of these primary religious acts and ideas, as we have it in *conscience*. "Consciousness and conscience rose together. Mind conscious of self was also mind conscious of obligation. The 'I am' and the 'I ought' were twins, born at the same moment. But to be conscious of obligation was to be conscious of relation, and so in one and the same act mind was conscious of a self who owed obedience and a Not-self to whom the obedience was due. The idea of God was thus given in the very same act as the idea of self, neither could be said to precede the other. Mind could be mind as little without the consciousness of God as without the consciousness of self."

Conscious mind is thus the religious faculty. On page 100 the same idea is expressed in another way. "Mind, the consciousness, in which both self and the universe (including God, see above) are revealed." (Mr. Fairbairn cannot help using here the word "revelation" before so much objected to).

But Mr. Fairbairn seems not yet satisfied with the conscious mind. He says (p. 12), "Religion is a permanent and universal characteristic of man, a normal and necessary *product of his nature* (this must mean mind in its state of unconsciousness). Religion is simply *spirit* expressing in symbol its consciousness of relations other and higher than physical and social." It is difficult to say whether the two sentences have the same meaning or not. Is this spirit the product of human nature? And is religion nothing but the

expression of higher relations? Mr. Fairbairn must have still felt some doubts, for he surprises us with yet another turn of explanation. "The *feelings* of dependence, reverence, devotion are universal—everywhere seek out and worship an appropriate object. And the object must be personal, a Being to love and command, be loved and obeyed." We see Mr. Fairbairn allows his readers a wide choice; the few passages quoted refer us to the religious capacity, instinct, faculties, conscience, imagination, moral sense, consciousness, product of the nature (of mind), spirit, feelings.

From all the quotations given above one thing is apparent enough, viz. that our problem is far from being settled, but is waiting yet for solution. Though in Germany all the great philosophers have treated the religious question, they have done so in connection with their metaphysical systems, and as their method has been logical, a mere logical explanation has been arrived at, which, of course, always proves to be a failure.

Science on the other hand, starting from matter and mechanical laws, though rather too often venturing into the sacred fields of religion and sometimes making crazy havoc among religious forms and parasites, scarcely ever came in contact with the true life of religion.* Most of the Theologians, in modern times at least (but it might be said from the 2nd century after Christ to the present day), have been led astray by the metaphysical and scientific speculations

* Jacobi said justly, "The belief in God is not science but a virtue;" see Dr. Jos. Beck, *Ency. der Theor. Phil.*, §382.

of the day, or they have walked in the convenient rut of tradition, State church theories, hierarchical prerogatives of priests and pastors, rituals and creeds, etc.

Schleiermacher was the man who with superior ability treated religion as a sphere of her own. He separated religion from the sciences of reason, but did not free her from the bondage of the abstract laws of logic to which metaphysics and all rationalistic systems are subject. Schleiermacher based religion on the feeling of dependence*—not on feelings, as he is often misunderstood to have done. This feeling did good service in so far as it allowed to religion a chance of escape from the torture it had to undergo in the systems of modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel and his followers.

Max Müller with his religious faculty is nothing but a Schleiermacherian.† The great objection to Schleiermacher is, therefore, the same as to Max Müller already given above. Religion is made merely subjective, and as men differ in the intensity etc. of their feeling of dependence, their religion must differ,

* His system, however, Schleiermacher construed more on a cosmical than on a moral dependence. His pantheistic-monistic mental philosophy influenced his theology. Religion is explained in a naturalistic way, even grace is made a cosmological power.

Comp. D. Bender Schleiermacher's Theology, 1878.

† Dr. Richard Rothe, one of the most distinguished followers of Schleiermacher, differs from his master in this respect. "There is no special faculty (Organ) for religion in man. Man has religion because he is man, *i.e.* his *I* is the faculty, in it God can find a *Thou* and can have its *Thou* in man. God acts on the human conscience and becomes thus its object. The idea of God in man is God's own action (*Wirkung*) on him. In the relation between God and the creatures every impulse originates in God, human love to God comes from God's love to man, is its response," etc. See Theologische Ethik, 2nd Edition, §117 ff. 177.

and one religion must be as right and as good as the other because it is always the only possible expression of the human factor under the given circumstances. Such theories are ruinous to a healthy development of genuine religion and obstructive to an appropriate understanding and hearty appreciation of religious truth. I may, therefore, be pardoned for a new attempt to find the proper key to the problem before us. I myself feel a lively interest in it, not only as a missionary, but as a human being. Religion is to me not an external calling but the element of my inner life. I find it not only in one faculty but in the very substance of my soul. Religion gives evidence of the human soul (spirit) as belonging to another world. Religion may therefore be called the *manifestation of a spiritual world of which the human soul forms one link**—it is the shadow of Eternity cast upon Earth-life.

It is thus not only the acknowledgement of a higher power as a source of life and happiness apparent in all religions, but also a feeling of man to be of the same kindred with the supreme power and to be destined for some kind of divine blessedness.

There is, on the other hand, penetrating the most religious minds, a deep and sad feeling of the loss of the once-existing state of direct intercourse with the world of Spirits (of course not in the spiritistic sense) and with the heavenly regions. There are complaints heard from the highest geniuses and noblest

* Those who take interest in the *preëxistence* of the human soul may read what *I. H. Fichte* says on the subject in his "Anthropology" and in his "Psychology."

men of all countries and ages, that we are strangers on earth and as it were in prison in our present body; that death liberates the soul and brings her home. The longing, groaning etc. of which Max Müller speaks finds its satisfactory explanation only in this fact; the human soul does not find herself in her congenial element, not in the region from which she has sprung and to which her very nature tends, where alone she can develop all her faculties, where alone she can feel free and happy.

We may say her *divine origin* makes the soul religious. Man bears the image of God, mankind is a divine race, man may partake in the blessed state of the gods. Not only Jewish, Christian, Greek, Indian and Persian* authors contain sentences with such purport, even among Chinese writers similar passages may be found.

Licius,† for example, says (I. 73) “the soul is the portion from Heaven, the body is the portion from Earth. What belongs to Heaven is clear and expanding, what belongs to Earth is turbid and contracting. When the soul leaves the (bodily) form each (soul and body) returns to its genuine being (truth). They (the deceased) are, therefore, called departed (here Kwei, the common word for demon is used). Departed (Kwei) means returned, returned to their true man-

* See Bunsen, *God in History*, and E. H. Gillett, *God in Human Thought*.

† Der Naturalismus bei den alten Chinesen, etc. oder sämtliche Werke des Philosophen Licius, zum erstenmale vollständig übersetzt und erklärt von Ernst Faber, 1877.

Elberfeld R. L. Fridrichs, London, Trübner & Co.; Shanghai Press, Mission Press; Kelly and Walsh; Hongkong, Lane, Crawford & Co.

sion. The Yellow Emperor said, the soul (*lit.* æthereal spirit) enters her gate, the body returns to its root; how may I remain !”

The question at the end is doubtless put by Licius, as his doctrines are pantheistic. The continuance of the terrestrial bodily personality must, of course, cease in death. In the designation “departed” (dæmon, Kwei), however, a continued existence as self-conscious and active spirit is expressed. This passage reminds us besides of Plato’s dualism.

I shall for the present quote only one more remarkable passage from Licius, I., 11. “Tsi-kung was tired of study and said to Confucius, ‘I wish for rest.’ Confucius (here always called Chung-ni) answered, ‘In life there is no rest.’ Tsi-kung said, ‘Is there nothing then to give me rest?’ Confucius answered, ‘There is! Behold the graves yonder, hall-like, ridge-like, roof-like, hatchet-like; there you will understand what gives rest.’ ‘O how great is death!’ exclaimed Tsi-kung, ‘The superior man it brings to rest, the low ones to submission.’ Confucius said, ‘Tshi (name of Tsi-kung) you know it now. Men all know the pleasure of life, but they do not yet know life’s bitterness; they know the frailty of old age, but do not know its ease; they know the horror of death, but not the rest in death.’ ‘Beautiful was,’ said Ngan Tsi,* ‘the death of the ancients,’†—the humane come to rest, the inhumane to submission. Death is virtue’s chance (re-

* Premier of the State of Tshi; see Mayers’ *Manual*, 917.

† In the work ascribed to Ngan Tsi the text differs, 昔者上帝以人之死爲善, “Shang-ti held the death of man as good.”

compense). The ancients called the dead gone home (returned).” “If the dead are gone home, the living are pilgrims (compare Tao-te-king, XVI.) He who is a pilgrim and forgets to go home loses his home; a man who has lost his home is blamed by the whole generation. But the whole world having lost their home there is nobody to blame them for it.” So far a Chinese philosopher about 400 B.C.

Such sentiments as these quoted from Licius, which can easily be multiplied from other authors of China and other countries, are a valid proof of the above-given theory of religion. I may, however, point to another not less valuable confirmation of it, that is the *universal belief in a life hereafter*.* I purposely do not say “immortality,” as that term implies a more abstract philosophical notion. Our life, the soul we feel to animate our corporeal frame, will not be extinguished after the frame is broken and dissolved into its chemical elements; the thoughts we think, the feelings we foster, the will we obey, the self-consciousness we enjoy will not disappear after the organism which served as a medium for the connexion with this world has been removed. “Death as annihilation,” says Mr. Fairbairn (p. 115), “is a notion as little intelligible to a primitive or undeveloped mind as immortality. A child cannot understand death as loss of being, cannot imagine the dead as otherwise than still alive.” (Why not? because against the nature of the human soul). “It thinks of them as existing somewhere, as

* A very good work on this subject is that by Ed. Spiess, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Vorstellungen vom Zustande nach dem Tode auf Grund vergleichender Religionsforschung*.

doing something, and neither the lifeless body, nor the grave, nor the burial can break their simple faith. The very attempt to represent them in thought is an attempt to represent living not dead men." I further agree with Mr. Fairbairn (p. 116),—"But while the belief in the future life springs out of what we must call, for want of a better term, an instinct, its evolution alike as the time occupied and the order of thought observed, depends on the development of the mental faculties as in their turn at once conditioning and conditioned by the history and situation of the people."

The weakness however of Mr. Fairbairn's theory becomes apparent in the following sentence, p. 113: "Not as a dogma of religion, or a doctrine of philosophy, but as a specifically human property involved in the very nature of man, evolved in the evolution of that nature, the belief in immortality needs to be discussed." Does religion then not belong to human nature, and is religious belief not also developed with human nature? Mr. Fairbairn is here, to say the least, in contradiction with his own theory of religion. We have, of course, to fall back on human nature in any thorough treatment of the question, but we have to take into account not only human nature as it is, but a whole other world with other connexions and other laws and forms of existence. Strictly speaking, however, it is not human nature but *the nature of the soul* which forms the basis for the life hereafter. Human nature implies one important factor, the bodily organisation which is left behind. Morals and politics have to start from human nature, whereas religion and

immortality have their root in the nature of the soul, though they both culminate in the resurrection of the body.* Our theory makes it comparatively easy to treat these difficult problems. The soul enters with death into her own natural sphere, only her relation to the material world is then changed. Such at least are the clear statements of all religions of the world. Against Mr. Fairbairn we may also add, that the belief in a life hereafter is everywhere connected with religion, and most naturally so. The exception of very few metaphysicians only confirms the rule.

II.

RELIGION IN FACT.

Max Müller says, p. 153, "We may distinguish religion as a silent power working in the heart of man from religion in its outward appearance." The science of religion, however, cannot confine herself to the latter only. Although we are unable to investigate the inner heart as we scrutinize outward actions, etc., yet we may perceive the influence of religious feelings, thoughts and maxims on the common practices of

* The Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body sanctions and involves the notion that there is some deep connexion between Spirit and Form which is essential, and which cannot be finally sundered even in the divorce of Death.—*The Reign of Law*, by the Duke of Argyll, p. 309.

individual, social and political life. Purification and sanctification of soul and body are required by many religions. It is, perhaps, of more interest in some respects to learn how different religions differ therein, than to know all their different names for God, sacrifices, etc. The practice of benevolence is inculcated by all religions, but again in different ways and it may be for different purposes.

Max Müller says on another page (263): "The intention of religion, wherever we meet it, is always holy. However imperfect, however childish the conception of God may be, it always represents the highest ideal of perfection which the human soul, for the time being, can reach and grasp. Religion, therefore, places the human soul in the presence of its highest ideal, it lifts it above the level of ordinary goodness, and produces at least a yearning after a higher and better life, a life in the light of God."

Max Müller also quotes (p. 152) Sir H. Maine, that in ancient times religion as a divine influence was "underlying and supporting every relation of life and every social institution. A supernatural presidency is supposed to consecrate and keep together all the cardinal institutions of those early times, the state, the race and the family;" and (p. 224) "Neither their art, nor their poetry, nor their philosophy would have been possible without religion, that is, religion cannot be separated from anything human, but art can, poetry can, philosophy can." Such are to us strong proofs that religion is not the development of *one* mental faculty, but is *spirit* and *inspiration* to all faculties, to the whole man.

Man as a being in the universe has relations to his fellow-men and to nature. These relations are mediated by sensations, actions and reactions through the body upon the soul. As a religious being man feels another relation to a superior power, to an invisible world, to a Something kindred to the intelligent and self-conscious life within himself, to which however he feels himself more or less estranged and opposed ; there again is action and reaction, but different from the first mentioned.

Any action, however, of Spirit on Spirit in another way than through bodily sensation and common reflection we must call *revelation*. Revelation is thus taken in a wide, yet in the most proper sense. Revelation is, to our mind (soul or spirit), what the light is to the eyes. We may boldly assert, *without revelation no religion!* Every religion leans on revelation, is occasioned by it, the lowest religions perhaps more than the higher. But we are sure to find revelation in a different state in different religions. We have nothing to fear from the objection made by Schelling that a primordial revelation makes the natural man altogether void of religion—"an original Atheism of consciousness." No ! Man is conscious of his connexion with God and the invisible world till the growing consciousness of nature overwhelms the other. If man had remained in his *status integritatis* he could have lived with his mind in connexion with the spiritual world, as he now does with the material. But it is not all lost. Religion shows the remaining portion of the life of the soul in those higher spheres. We have to gather carefully what each religion takes as revela

tion. We shall find, even in Chinese religion, quite a number of facts, perhaps astonishing to many scholars to whom it seems without doubt that the Chinese do not believe in revelation; they do believe in it, perhaps too much.

We may distinguish revelations of the past which happened only once, as the creation of the world, certain miracles called forth by peculiar circumstances, as at the birth of great men, etc., and revelations which may occur even at the present time through dreams, divination, etc. Without revelation, especially of the second kind, no religion could keep its influence upon the minds of the people. As a revelation we have further to consider anything taken as an indication of the divine guidance of the world, especially of human affairs, as retribution, rewards or punishments of a superhuman kind.

We shall have to look at the manifestations (at least so far as they are believed in) of an evil power or perhaps evil powers. Many natural calamities are taken as caused by evil spirits; there are *dæmoniac* influences, and even possessions. We have for our immediate purpose nothing to do with the explanation of such things, but have to state them as religious facts, as traces of a preternatural revelation.

But, though revelation is the principal factor in religion, it is not the only one. Man is the religious subject. We find in all religions a more or less developed religious psychology, something on the origin of man, his spirit, soul, the great problems of life, the temptations from within and without, a spiritual life contrary to the natural life, sin, sickness,

death, the life hereafter—all as topics of almost every religion.

Lastly, we see many things done through the influence of religion as an expression of the relation between man and the spiritual world, performances which have no other meaning whatever. Indications of such we see in all the temples, altars, sacrifices (human, animal), offerings (vegetable and mineral, wine, spirits, etc.), vessels used for sacred purposes, clothes and ornaments, idols and other representations of gods and spirits. We meet with prayers, curses, blessings, oaths, fastings and watchings and other purifications, different modes of augury and divination, sorcery, charms, mediums, priests, saints, clairvoyance and ecstasy. We find peculiar religious virtues, as faith, devotion, abstinence, martyrdom, etc.; we find holy scriptures and inspirations, etc. Religion, to judge from all these facts, is animated by a life of a peculiar character, different in many respects from our common life whose face is towards earth and whose connexions are with the mundane world; but religion has her face towards heaven, *i.e.* to the supramundane (though immanent), the Spiritual, the Divine world.

We shall see all these things verified even in China.

III.

RELIGION AND THEOLOGY.

From religion we have carefully to distinguish theology. Religion is nature, theology is art, *i.e.* not a necessary growth out of the nature of the human soul, but it is explanation and structure, a deed of the intellect of man. The religious facts and their intellectual interpretations, the religious ideas and the theological developments and systems built upon them, are very different things. As an intellectual science theology is subject to the laws of reason, and is consequently in its most perfect systems always rationalistic. Even Max Müller acknowledges (p. 17) that religion is in a certain sense necessarily, because naturally, contradicted by reason. Theology and religion, therefore, can never become identical, but only more or less adequate to each other. In Max Müller's lectures, however, religion and theology run, imperceptibly but continuously, one into the other. This serious fault is not Max Müller's alone; our whole age is sick from the same disease. There are only very few books,

if any, written on religion in general or on the religion of a certain nation, where mistakes of this kind are avoided. Views and theories of renowned or obscure authors are not religion. They may, perhaps, be of some help to us towards a better understanding of the meaning of a strange religious practice or idea, but they may also, which is oftener the case, be misleading. We find among the adherents of every religion different explanations of the same religious facts, different views in regard to the same religious ideas. These differences of theological opinion may be tolerated by a religion and remain more in books than in public life, as is now the case in China ; or they may lead to the formation of different churches and creeds, as in India and among Mohamedans and Christians. Yet all these controversies belong to theology and not to religion.

I do not mean to disparage theology : theology is necessary ; man cannot remain in the primitive and more intuitive state of religion ; he must make attempts to understand what he is doing and believing. Nevertheless, what I think of greatest importance is to raise the voice again and again against every identification of theology with religion, which mistake is doing great damage to the churches and to scientific endeavours. Nearly all the works written on religion belong, with very few exceptions indeed, to theology or philosophy, but not to religion. They may be religious in an eminent sense, yet so far as they contain reflections and reasonings they have to be distinguished from religion itself. Where reason gains the sway over religion, religious life will turn shallow and more super-

stitious in other respects. Scepticism will be a sure result of every undue entrance of reason upon the domain of religion. Reason has only a purifying and healthy effect on religious life if it clears up the true nature of religion and its laws. But this nature and these laws must be found by induction from religion itself; it must be proved that such laws are really the laws of religion. Too often metaphysical or even physical notions have been smuggled in. By a legal use of reason *superstition* can be dispelled, as it will be shown to be contrary to the nature and the laws of true religion.

Much has been spoken of a *natural* or *rational religion*, which commonly meant a religion developed from the laws of logic without any other than formal contents—a mere negation of revealed religion; a rational belief, *Denkglaube*, “which thinks to believe and believes to think.” Other theologians and philosophers assumed a universal primitive revelation. Max Müller says of it (p. 137), “This universal primeval revelation is only another name for natural religion, and it rests on no authority but the speculations of philosophers.” This is true in so far as the two terms have been used as synonyms. In another sense revelation is the germ and the human mind the congenial soil (p. 133, 140) of religion.

“The controversial writings of different schools of thought and faith, all claiming to be orthodox, yet differing from each other like day and night,” Max Müller (p. 110) calls, “The inevitable parasites of theological literature.”

From the statements above we may take warn-

ing not to call the science of religion "theology." I have to disagree with Max Müller, who makes comparative theology the equivalent, or synonymous with comparative religion. Comparative theology ought to compare the theological speculations of all nations and times, the problems they have treated, the methods they have pursued and the results they have gained. Comparative religion, however, ought to confine itself to a comparison of all religious facts and beliefs, as stated above. Theoretical theology may investigate the metaphysical questions connected with both religion and theology. Any confusion of these three distinct sciences is unscientific, will produce misconceptions and lead to misunderstandings.

Another source of serious mistakes we have yet to mention, of which Max Müller, however, is free—that is, the promiscuous use of authorities from different epochs and from far differing parties. Such nonsense, if one may use the most appropriate expression, prevails to a nauseating extent in works on the religion of China; this ought not to be tolerated in the future. What should we say if a Chinaman in England or America were to write a book on Christian Cosmogony and mix up in it the views of modern writers on Geology and Darwinism, together with quotations from church-fathers, scholastics, gnostics, and passages from the Bible; or if one were to take the views of David Strauss as those of Christ, because they are generally (though fortunately with many exceptions) believed in by the educated classes in Germany! No Chinaman has yet done such a thing, but Western scholars have done it in works on China. It may

suffice to mention the subject without exposing any author.

As I have already criticised Max Müller very freely, and as I shall be under obligation to state some further disagreements in the following chapters, I take here a welcome opportunity to express a sincere agreement with Max Müller's chapter on false analogies in comparative theology (p. 283-334), and would warmly recommend it to all who undertake to write on similar topics.

IV.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

By Science a systematic knowledge of nature is here understood. Nature we call the realm of matter, its various forms of existence, appearances and changes. The human mind desires to understand the world around itself; man attempts to interpret nature. He may do so in two different ways: starting from his mind, nature is then understood when it is made to conform to mind, the laws of mind are shown to be those of nature; nature is thus only another appearance of one and the same mind. This is the *idealistic* interpretation of nature. The other explanation starts from the external realities of nature; all facts, though represented by the mind, are supposed to be beyond

any influence of the mind. Abstractions are made and laws established by induction, and mind itself is then made only another appearance of nature or matter. This is the *realistic* interpretation of nature. The results of both interpretations are, of course, very different, we may say, exclusive of each other. The reason is, they are both onesided and delusive. It is a delusion of idealism that for *mind* unconsciously and commonly the human mind is taken and not the universal mind (different from a mind of the universe): It is a delusion of realism that nature is considered the cause of mind and mind is thus more or less a mere *abstraction*, different from the real human mind. We here merely point to these difficulties. Religion itself is little affected by any explanation of nature, perhaps even less than poetry. But religious speculations may be upset by scientific researches. "Imperfect and transitory doctrines in theology can, however, as little disprove religion as provisional theories in science can discredit nature."*

Religion shows the connexion of the soul with another world. There is, however, a relation between this Spiritual world, or the divine world, or God, however we may call it, and the material world. This relation may be conceived under forms the most varied. Mr. Fairbairn says, (p. 22), "Man borrows from nature the symbols by which he tries to articulate his faith. The phenomena of generation have suggested an emanational relation of Deity to the world; those

* Fairbairn, *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History*, p. 72.

of organic life an immanent, those of adaptation an architectonic.

“The deistic idea and the cosmic form may thus so grow together as to seem indissoluble and even identical. In ages when science is active and progressive, it may so revolutionize our knowledge of natural processes and laws as to break up our cosmic conception, and change into antiquated errors the forms in which the theistic idea had been expressed. This decay of old cosmic notions may involve the decay of theological formulæ, but need not touch the truth they provisionally expressed.”

“The world needed God (p. 8 ff.) to become intelligible; God did not need the world to become credible. Men were theists before they were scientists, believed in the Being of God before they had thought of either a creator or a cause. And even where he was conceived as creator, he was not conceived as a manufacturer or mechanic, but as a maker by a process as natural and immanent as the thinking, the speech and the volition of man. Any interpretation of nature that leaves out any creative and causal energy or force must be inadequate. Any conception of God that leaves out His active qualities, His energies and their action, must be insufficient.” So far all is true and well said, and has my full consent. I must however ask permission to disagree with Mr. Fairbairn’s following sentence, “Nature realises our idea of God”—has the idea no reality elsewhere?—“shows His energies in action, His life in contact with ours.” True again, if we do not presume that God’s energies are, as it were, exhausted in nature.

We must at least guard against here confining the meaning of *nature* to the nature of this world, which is subject to our sense-perception. Our Spirit (soul) has a nature too; God himself has a nature, the inaccessible light, the eternal glory that surrounds him. His divine nature is the adequate manifestation of the divine Being, the outside of the inner thought of God, the external formation of the eternal ideas, a world which is an emanation of God, not a creation, as the material world is. Only by thus distinguishing the nature in God which emanates—His only-begotten son, the “brightness of His glory and the express image of His person”—from this material and created world, can we escape pantheism in all its various forms.* Though God is not separated from the material world, though he to a certain degree is immanent in it, as all life is in close connection with Him the source of life, as every action is connected with Him the supreme cause, yet this world in all its beauty, etc. cannot reveal the fulness of the riches of the divine Being. God is also eminent, high above the nature of our world. This world is only *one* of the manifestations of God’s Being, not *the* Being of God itself. Besides the manifestation of God through the nature of this world is not yet finished, *i.e.* this world is yet in a state of imperfection, partly even of corruption. Science takes nature as it is, religion not only so, but more as it ought to be. Religion wants a nature which is in fact the revelation of Spirit, in and

* This view may be said to be the characteristic feature of Franz v. Brader’s philosophy in distinction from Schelling’s.

through which mind can manifest all its powers in the most perfect manner without ever suffering from the pernicious influences of this nature.

It is not alone the Christian religion that speaks of another world where no more death and corruption reign, where the nature is completely subject to Spirit and God. Other religions also affirm that the abode of the gods is a region where other laws of existence reign, and that death cannot reach the gods, or if it does for a time, death is to be overcome in the future by one of the gods. Our human existence even has not yet reached its highest form of perfection, the natural development has been checked by sin, death breaks it off, and a new beginning is to be made. The Chinese are not at all ignorant of this feature of religion. It is again Licius who furnishes us with materials in this respect. I shall however not enter into details at present, but point to another fact. Perhaps all religions without exception know of a *peculiar power of mind over nature*. Not only may the mind (soul), by help of a special preparation, become temporarily freed from the bonds of the body, but we are also told, and facts are related in proof, that the mind can gradually gain a miraculous power over the body so far that the body seems no more subject to physical laws but must follow unconditionally the will of mind, its master. Taoism is the most developed system in this respect, Buddhism and even Confucianism contain many such elements. We have only to remember the miracles wrought by their Saints. Though of Confucius himself no miracles are recorded, yet the power of the Saint is described as equal to Heaven and Earth.

A third instance consists in the power of the mind even over external nature; many phenomena of nature are considered as under the influence of some persons who exert a magical power over it. Not only are there *rainmakers* in all countries, but the common belief of ancient and modern Confucianism maintains also that any irregularity in the administration of social and political life will produce a corresponding disorder in the course of nature. We see the idea clearly enough: nature is considered to be the body of mind (Spirit), as the human body is of the human mind. The *whole nature is under the influence of mind*. That this must be the universal mind is forgotten, and as the human mind is the only one of which man has a clear and immediate conception he is misled to take his own mind as the mind of nature. This is the source of many superstitions.

Other heathen, however, are fully aware, that there is another mind in nature than in us, that there are even different minds in different parts of nature. Man then attempts to influence those minds by his mind. Thus man will not himself influence nature directly, but by influencing the gods he will induce them to do in nature what he wants to be accomplished. The *means* used to arrive at this end are different among different people. Some allow only religious means, conformity of the heart to the will of the gods; others use moral means, perfection in what is good, or holiness; others employ physical contrivances, elixirs, etc.; but there is besides used a good deal of mere formalism, as enchantments, peculiar rites, symbols, etc. The power of mind over

nature is evidently overrated in such religious proceedings, even where a knowledge of the universal mind is retained. The mistake is, that such people are not more conscious of the important fact, that the universal Mind acts in accordance with the eternal laws of His own nature (and will), but never with any whimsical notion of a human being.

Science, on the other hand, denies too much. There are not only mechanical laws acting in nature, mind is also acting in it; a personal God is behind nature and is manifesting Himself in nature and through nature. I myself entertain, therefore, not the least doubt that God answers prayer. I even believe that no sincere prayer will remain unanswered; but the divine answer will always be in accordance with divine will and not exactly in accord with human wishes. Mr. J. A. Froude* objects. "To pray," he says, "is to expect a miracle. When we pray for the recovery of a sick friend, for the gift of any blessing, or the removal of any calamity, we expect that God will do something by an act of His personal will which otherwise would not have been done, that He will suspend the ordinary relations of natural cause and effect, and this is the very idea of a miracle. The thing we pray for may be given us, and no miracle may have taken place. It may be given to us by natural causes, and would have occurred whether we had prayed or not. But prayer itself in its very essence implies a belief in the possible intervention of a power which is above nature." This is a clear

* *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, 3 vols., vol. I. p. 228.

statement of the common disbelief of our age. It contains, however, more thoughtlessness than thought, more nonsense than sense. We could as well argue that to call a physician for a sick friend is to expect a miracle. Every sickness is a natural occurrence and to interfere with it is an attempt to suspend the ordinary relations of natural cause and effect. The friend may get well without medicine; to call a physician implies a belief in the possible intervention of his power as being above nature. It is scarcely credible how blind people are made by their favourite theories. People of common sense perfectly understand that a physician acts by natural agencies as well as the disease is brought on and developed by such; the physician's work consists in an *intelligent* direction of one natural agency against another. There is no suspension of ordinary relations of natural cause and effect, but by the superiority of mind above nature some natural agencies may be brought in direct action upon the desired point which will produce in the most natural way the wished-for effect. "There are no phenomena visible to man of which it is true to say that they are governed by any invariable Force. That which does govern them is always some variable combination of invariable forces. But this makes all the difference in reasoning on the relation of Will to Law; this is the one essential distinction to be admitted and observed. There is no observed order of facts which is not due to a combination of Forces; and there is no combination of Forces which is invariable, none which are not capable of change in infinite degrees. In these senses, and these are the common senses in which Law

is used to express the phenomena of Nature, Law is not rigid, it is not immutable, it is not invariable, but it is, on the contrary, pliable, subtle and various. In the only sense in which laws are immutable this immutability is the very characteristic which makes them subject to guidance through endless cycles of design. We know this in our own case. It is the very certainty and invariableness of the laws of Nature which alone enables us to use them, and to yoke them to our service."

"Now, the laws of Nature are employed in the system of Nature in a manner precisely analogous to that in which we ourselves employ them. The difficulties and obstructions which are presented by one law in the way of accomplishing a given purpose, are met and overcome exactly on the same principle on which they are met and overcome by Man, viz., by knowledge of other laws, and by resource in applying them, that is by ingenuity in mechanical contrivance. It cannot be too much insisted on, that this is a conclusion of pure science."*

If the knowledge and power of God were not far superior to our very limited knowledge of the laws of nature, etc., I should, of course, think prayer useless. But as it is, I go on praying in spite of all laws of nature, for God is not the slave of nature, but its governor; the laws of nature are not dead machines, but the working of His intentions; God is intelligence, is will and is love, and has many ways to accomplish what He purposes. A God who could not hear

* *The Reign of Law*, by the Duke of Argyll, p. 100.

prayers would be less than man, for man has a great field left to free action. For the present we may be glad that the real Christian God is neither so narrow-minded nor so weak as the theoretical God of some scientific writers.

It is one of the most important tenets of religion, that nature is living. Though we have to guard against all superstitions connected with this point, yet religion contains the truth, as it were, instinctively. Science is however of high value, not only for practical life but also to religion, if it keeps in its proper sphere and does not venture beyond experience and proper explanation of experience (sense-perception). The conflict of religion and science is never a conflict of religion and nature, but commonly a conflict of theories on religion (theology) and of hypothetical theories on nature, misnamed science, being in fact metaphysical speculations.*

We must, besides, become conscious of the fact that all science, even the most realistic or objective, depends on the mind and on the conditions of our sense-perceptions.† Where we construe facts to a system, draw conclusions, etc., there mind is at work and the results are not nature but *thought*. Mr. Fairbairn says well (p. 103), "Mind in interpreting the universe cannot escape from itself, must begin with

* The Duke of Argyll, in *The Reign of Law*, might have arrived at the same conclusion if he had gone on one step farther. For full harmony men are not yet ripe, there are differences of opinion in all departments of human knowledge, the so-called exact sciences, even mathematics, not excepted.

† Comp. the excellent work, by Dr. Herman Ulrici, *Gott und die Natur*. Leipzig, T. O. Weigel.

thought, and what thought supplies and implies. The interpretation of nature is the interpretation of thought by thought, the translation of ideas out of a mystic, unspoken unwritten speech into the speech of men. The reason science exhibits, but reflects the reason nature embodies. The intelligible implies intelligence; what can be construed pre-supposes mind." I am sure that no serious objection can be made to this assertion; the truth of German-Scotch Idealism is contained in it. Mr. Fairbairn explains his idea on other pages more explicitly. He says (p. 92 ff), "Process or method is one thing, cause another (generally confounded by our modern scientists). A process starts at the lowest point and culminates in the highest; begins with the least, ends with the most perfect. But the lowest does not explain the highest, is not the sufficient reason of its existence. The cause must be adequate, not only to the immediate, but to the ultimate effect, must continue active and operative to the end. The genesis of a form is not explained when it is shown how it came to be, but only when what caused it to be is made evident. Evolution has done the one, but not the other, has simplified our notion of the creational method, but not of the creational cause. For evolution can allow no element to steal into the effect that cannot be traced to the cause. What is evolved in the one was involved in the other. On this principle, *mind*, as the latest and highest result of the creative process, cannot have been absent from the creative cause." In other words, of mind, reason, self-conscious voluntary and intelligent Spirit, or whatever we acknowledge of such kind, there must be presup-

posed a cause sufficient to produce such an effect, the highest intelligence must be latent, as a disposition, in the first element. Then the question arises, how could it be latent at all without its being caused to be so, and why did its development not begin millions of years sooner? What is the cause of the first commencement of any evolution?

All mechanical theories must confess their inefficiency to explain life and the origin of things, or they make nature a *perpetuum mobile*, which implies that everything has been going on eternally as at present. There have always been the same elements and the same powers, there must have been the same results. This, of course, is nonsense, or better consequence carried *ad absurdum*.

Evolution is nonsense too, because it presupposes a beginning and an end, gives a description of a portion, lying between beginning and end, but is unable to give a satisfactory explanation. We find everywhere *reason*—mind, Spirit, God—as the source and end of this natural world. Any explanation of nature built on such premises is right in principle, though it may be wrong in details. Mr. Fairbairn is right in saying, “the grand theistic problem of our time is, not how to prove the existence of God, but how to conceive His relation to the world.”

I think it one of the tasks of the science of religion to state clearly how the different religions conceive of God's relation to the world. If there is not one God believed in, but many gods, or spirits etc., yet there will in all cases be seen a relation between the invisible world and the visible. It is certainly of

greatest interest to get a full knowledge and some understanding of such beliefs.

Science, we may say, is as much contradictory to true religion as to true love. Ladies and gentlemen may be very scientific, yet they fall in love and continue in it in the most unscientific way. Why? Because the sphere of love is one and the sphere of science is another. It is just the same case with religion, its sphere is not the same with that of science, not a relation between the mind and some objects, but an engagement of my person as a person to other persons, or to something like personality.

Lately a work has appeared as volume XIII. of the International Scientific Series (Henry S. King & Co., London), whose title is very promising, "History of the conflict between Religion and Science, by John William Draper, M.D., LL.D." The contents of the book, however, do not meet any reasonable expectation in regard to its title page. Dr. Draper tells us, Preface xiii., "I first direct attention to the origin of modern science as distinguished from ancient, by depending on observation, experiment, and mathematical discussion, instead of mere speculation, and shall show that it was a consequence of the Macedonian campaigns, which brought Asia and Europe in contact." Dr. Draper shows, however, that science, even in the modern sense, had already existed long before that time in Babylon and Nineveh, and the campaigns referred to did nothing except making Europeans acquainted with Asiatic civilization and stimulated some minds for further research. "Then with brevity

I recall the well-known origin of Christianity and show its advance to the attainment of imperial power, the transformation it underwent by its incorporation with paganism, the existing religion of the Roman Empire. A clear conception of its incompatibility with science caused it to suppress forcibly the schools of Alexandria. It was constrained to this by the political necessities of its position." Religion is here at once the Christian religion, and Christian religion is made in fact the policy of the Roman Empire or paganised Christianity. I hope Dr. Draper will grant that there was very little indeed of the Religion of Christ visible in the policy of the Roman Empire and not very much in the policy of the Papacy. That the Christian religion is not incompatible with science, even in the strict modern sense, is proved by persons like Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, Pascal, Cuvier, Baer and many others who were pious Christians and eminent scientific men. Dr. Draper ought then to have spoken not of religion in general nor of the Christian religion, but of the Roman church, and perhaps even more correctly of the Roman hierarchy.

Dr. Draper himself says (p. 52), "The reign of Constantine marks the epoch of the transformation of Christianity from a religion into a political system," and p. 329, "The Roman Catholic Church is far more a political than a religious combination. Its principle is that all power is in the clergy, and that for laymen there is only the privilege of obedience." A very striking detailed description of the depth of intellectual degradation this policy of paganisation eventually led to, is given (p. 48 ff.).

“The parties to the conflict thus placed,” Dr. Draper continues, “I next relate the story of their *first open struggle*; it is the first or Southern Reformation (!) The point in dispute had respect to the nature of God. It involved the rise of Moham-medanism.” But where is here a conflict between Religion and Science, that depends on observation, experiment, and mathematical discussion? Have the Mohamedans an experimental God? Or one demonstrable by mathematics? The second of Dr. Draper’s conflicts is remarkable in the same sense as the first. “Those (Arabian) conquerors, pressing forward rapidly in their intellectual development, rejected the anthropomorphic ideas of the nature of God remaining in their popular belief, and accepted other more philosophical ones, akin to those that had long previously been attained to in India. The result of this was a *second conflict*, that respecting the nature of the soul.” We have to remember Dr. Draper promised us a “History of the Conflict between Religion and Science,” yet he gives us again some metaphysical speculations, “theories of Emanation and Absorption,” which Dr. Draper pleases to take for science; and the anathema of the Vatican Council appears as Dr. Draper’s “Religion”; on p. 209, it is, however, better termed “tyrannical acts of ecclesiasticism.” “Meantime, through the cultivation of astronomy, geography, and other sciences, correct views had been gained as to the position and relations of the earth, and as to the structure of the world; and since Religion, resting itself on what was assumed to be the proper interpretation of the scriptures, insisted that

the earth is the central and most important part of the universe, a *third conflict* broke out." Dr. Draper seems not to know that the most decided and perhaps most ardent opponent of the new scientific theory was the most scientific man of his century, Tycho de Brahe. Religion had only very little to do with the question, but the authorities of the Roman Church had some interests endangered which aroused their opposition. The Roman Church is, however, not more to blame for her conservatism than other parties in theirs. Every new discovery and invention has to overcome more or less opposition from some quarters. Dr. Draper, as M.D., knows doubtlessly a little of the sentiments of allopathic physicians towards homœopathic practitioners. Yet both parties claim to be scientific medical scholars, having passed their regular courses of study and obtained the right to place "*M.D.*" after their names. Dr. Draper is also not quite right in saying, "its issue (the conflicts) was the overthrow of the Church on the question in dispute." It was not the Church that would have been overthrown, not even a dogma of the Church, for there never has been such a dogma in Christian creeds that "the earth is the central . . . part of the universe;" what has been overthrown is nothing but a mere opinion of the ruling class of the Church, and probably of a great majority of the educated and uneducated people of that time.

"In the sixth century the prestige of Roman Christianity was greatly diminished by the intellectual reverses it had experienced, and also by its political and moral condition. It was clearly seen by many

pious men that Religion was not accountable for the false position in which she was found, but that the misfortune was directly traceable to the alliance she had of old contracted with Roman paganism. The obvious remedy, therefore, was a return to primitive purity. Thus arose the *fourth conflict*, known to us as the Reformation, the second or Northern Reformation. The special form it assumed was a contest respecting the standard or criterion of truth, whether it is to be found in the Church or in the Bible. The determination of this involved a settlement of the rights of reason, or intellectual freedom. Luther, who is the conspicuous man of the epoch, carried into effect his intention with no inconsiderable success; and at the close of the struggle it was found that Northern Europe was lost to Roman Christianity." One is justly surprised to find these sentences as the description of a fourth conflict between Religion and Science. Dr. Draper's very words confute his supposition. Roman Christianity, a "paganized Religion," were in conflict with true Christian religion, Church and Bible; external authority and conscientious conviction were found in opposition, but Luther certainly was more religious and perhaps less scientific than many of his opponents; he and his genuine adherents, though lost to Roman Christianity, were not lost to Christian religion. We have to regard Dr. Draper's book a failure both in regard to Religion and to Science. The book says nothing of the relation between genuine Religion and true Science, but speaks only of the bearing of a certain Church policy towards some newly-starting sciences, and perhaps

towards some tendencies of more developed sciences. We know very well that the Roman Church wants to be the only authority in the world, and that therefore all other authorities have to wage war against her presumption. Not only state governments, but even reason and conscience are the perpetual antagonists of Rome. Thus not Religion or science is the question between Protestants and the Ultramontanes, but whether Christ is our Master or a sinner whom they please to call the 'infallible pope.' All pages in Dr. Draper's book speaking of paganised Christianity are well worth reading, and some careful meditation on it might become useful to all readers.

V.

RELIGION AND MORALS.

All religions inculcate precepts of morality, yet the difference of the religions is perhaps more apparent in morality than in other things. It is of the greatest interest to find out the true relation of each religion to morality, *i.e.* the peculiar morals connected with a given religion. We have, however, to distinguish between the morals of a nation and the morals of its religion. The morals of the English people are not equal to the morals of Christianity; those of Buddhists not those of Buddhism. Man is not influenced by religion or by the moral sense alone; there are other motives in play, which may prove even

more powerful than those mentioned. We are, therefore, not justified in drawing conclusions from the state of morality of nations or individuals on the nature of the religion they confess. It may be that religion exerts no great influence on their hearts. The cruelty of the Spaniards in America is no proof that the Christian religion is cruel, nor the iconolatry (worship of pictures) of the Byzantines that the Christian religion is but another form of polytheism, nor the sale of indulgences in the Romish Church, that the Christian religion allows forgiveness of sins for money, etc. Though any action of man is always a fruit of his belief and though the belief must be judged by the fruits, yet the belief of a time or of individuals may be different from the religious belief to which an external relation exists. From the morality which we observe we are justified in judging the character of the people; of a religion only if it can be proved that the people are, generally speaking, sincere adherents to their religion and if no *other form* of this religion exists. Neither the Romish Church, nor the Greek, nor any of the Protestant churches represent the full idea of Christianity, but each of them is a nearer or remoter approximation towards it. We must know the Spirit of Christ, the most ethical holy Spirit, to enable us to judge which form of Christianity is the most Christian. The same rule applies to other religions.

Morals have besides different sources; all morality does not bear a religious character. We find among all nations some morals that are thought independent of religion, perhaps in contradiction to local religion. Such morals may have found their formulation and

foundation in the systems of philosophers, though their real source is always the public life of men; we may say the morals are the normal expression of our social and political relations, especially the former. The aim of such morality is to make the best of man for human society and for the various requirements of a State. This kind of morality may have little or no room for religion. Some philosophers, speaking of morality as the highest development and end of religion, have only this worldly point of view; religion is to them only subservient to a tolerable human life on earth, and as morals seem to answer this purpose far better than anything else, morality is extolled above religion. We have to repeat again that religion has quite another sphere. Its immediate purpose is not to make man happy on earth, but to bring him in close communication with the Divine world, ensure the blessings from above and prepare for eternal happiness. All religious precepts must have this aim. The moral life religion requires is not so much for worldly as for religious purposes. "Thou shalt not steal" is commanded by religion, not because by stealing injury is done to a fellow-man and consequently the human relation is disturbed or made impossible, but because it shows covetousness after perishable things, breaks the faith on Divine help, vanquishes the hope for a treasure in heaven. Chastity is required, not because the reverse is injurious to one's own body and to another person, but because our body is to be a temple of the Divine Spirit and must as such not be defiled. Religious morality is thus the *realization of the Divine will and purpose in human life*. As far as man ac-

completes this, his true destiny, he sanctifies himself; his mind and his sentiment, gradually his whole nature, are impregnated with the Divine Spirit—the ethical union between man and God is effectuated. This process is preliminary to a participation in the Divine glory and qualifies man for it. The idea of an apotheosis, *i.e.* an elevation and transformation of man into a god, entertained by almost every religion, is true and excellent in itself; we must, however, carefully look at its different appearances in different religions. We see here again the close connexion between the human Soul and the Divine world. Only for religious morality there is, consequently, a reward hoped for in another world, and any immoral behaviour must of necessity bring in punishment after death.

The common secular morality cannot admit the retribution in after life, but confines all expectations to this life, or, if a man hopes to leave a name after death, it is certainly in this world only. I hope the idea is clear enough. I regret very much that we have not two different expressions for these two kinds of morality. We might try the expedient of confining the term “morals” to the worldly sphere, and perhaps “ethics,” or any other term, to the religious kind of conduct. There can be no doubt that the term *Morals* is in its usage more external and for this reason not liked in Germany: many students find, however, “Christliche Ethik (Sittenlehre)” and “Heidnische Moral” appropriate expressions. We may thus venture to distinguish between the two terms in the sense already stated. As one of their characteristic features we see that religious ethics regard men especially as indi-

viduals and give the greatest impulse to the utmost development of a perfect ethical personality. Philosophic morals regard men more as members of society, where individuality must be made subordinate and personality is only of value as far it fits itself to society and State. Such generalities must, however, not be pressed too much. Some religions go beyond individual life; Christianity finds a higher perfection in the *community of Saints*, the close intercourse of its members among themselves. The Christian *ethos* is more a child of such intercommunication than of private or individual life. As these communities are not based on natural bonds of relationship, nor on worldly motives, but only on the same belief and aim, they are educational as regards the individual members and are of great importance to a genuine religious life. It is not the place here to enter farther into this subject. I must, however, not forget to mention that Christianity sees its highest perfection in the Kingdom of Heaven. Each individual member has there a place according to his individuality or personal character, and all individualities are in concord with each other and penetrated by the Divine Spirit, so that all together make a Heavenly concert of the most perfect harmony and beauty. There we see the perfect realisation of the divine idea of human life. Christian happiness consists in perfection, perfection of one's own human nature and of the nature around us, to which we are related in some way.

Religious ethics, however, not only regulate human *actions*, but human *sufferings* and *enjoyments* are not less under its control. There are the common

enjoyments of life; how does the special religion regard them—which are allowed and how? Which are forbidden and how? What peculiar enjoyments does the religion itself bring to the followers? Each religion celebrates festivals, has days of rejoicing, there are repasts connected with some sacrifices, there are processions, theatres, etc.

It is very remarkable that the joys and pleasures of life, cherished by any religion, are scarcely treated under the ethical point of view. Yet there is no religion without such cheering features. Of not less importance is the relation of religion to the *sufferings* in human life. What comforts has the special religion for the different trials, and how are they ethified? There are also peculiar sufferings in connection with religion recommended, perhaps commanded, by it, as abstinence, self-afflicted pain, castigations, penitence, mutilations, abnegations of some or all secular relations, death or martyrdom, etc. Every religion contains some peculiarities in this respect. Regarding the actions of man it is not only of interest to know what is considered a *duty*, what a *virtue*, what a *vice*, but also how far man has a *free determination*, and where *fate* or *divine destiny* put limits on him. How far can man perform what is good by his own strength, and where does he need *Divine help*, and in what way and to what extent is this granted to him? How far is external nature influenced by the moral or immoral behaviour of man? Is there a perfect state of Nature corresponding to the perfection of the moral constitution of man, to holy life, and how is it described? What are the hindrances to the attainment

of perfect holiness? What are their causes and what their remedies? Are there privileged classes in society, and why and how are they regarded as different? What is considered as a normal standard for females in distinction from that of males; for children from that of parents; for subjects from that of rulers? To all these questions of ethics the different religions give different answers. We might say every religion ascribes to man a different moral constitution and has itself a somewhat differing relation to it; the influence of religion on man's moral constitution is consequently very different, and partly from this cause result the multifarious characters seen in individuals and nations of different religions.

VI.

RELIGION AND LAW (AND
POLITICS).

All laws which are given for the conduct of men presuppose society,* *i.e.* a constant intercourse of man with other men. Law intends to regulate this intercourse. There is no law for Robinson Crusoe as long as he lives alone on his island, but law begins as soon as he finds another man. *The will* of the superior is law to the inferior. Law itself has, however, its law or regulation in human nature. Any laws against human nature will arouse the powers of this nature to fearful opposition. Human nature consists not only in our will, or reason, or feelings, but in our whole mental

* The historical school (of jurisprudence, Savigny, etc.), maintains that only the unconscious acting National-Spirit that penetrates every Individual can be regarded as the origin of language, custom and right. But this is only the subjective origin. There is, on the other side, a necessity felt to establish definite rules for living together in a more or less orderly manner. *Dr. H. Ahrens*, *Juristische Encyclopædie*, Wien, 1855. *A. Trendelenburg* in his "*Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik*" §7-83 develops the ethical, the physical (compulsory) and the logical qualities of right.

and bodily constitution. This is the reason that in primitive ages we find no distinction made between civil, moral and religious laws. Only gradually, when society became more complicated, a separation of the different kinds of law was effected. H. Maine says,* "We can see that Brahminical India has not passed beyond a stage which occurs in the history of all the families of mankind, the stage at which a rule of law is not yet discriminated from a rule of religion. The members of such a society consider that the transgression of a religious ordinance should be punished by civil penalties, and that the violation of a civil duty exposes the delinquent to divine correction. In China this point has been passed, but progress seems to have been there arrested, because the civil laws are co-extensive with all the ideas of which the race is capable (?). The difference between the stationary and progressive societies is, however, one of the great secrets which inquiry has yet to penetrate."

The cause of this difference is of course meant. Stagnation is, however, only relative, never absolute. Change and also some progress is appearing in the laws of successive ages of all nations, even of the Chinese.

It is of interest for our next purpose to find out which consideration, the civil, political, moral or religious, was predominating in the first appearance of law among each of the different nations and tribes.†

* Ancient Law, p. 22.

† Prof. Dr. Bastian's works contain valuable materials, especially his "Die Rechtsverhältnisse bei verschiedenen Völkern der Erde."

“Among the Hindoos,* the religious element in law has acquired a complete predominance. Family sacrifices have become the keystone of all the Law of Persons and much of the Law of Things. They have even received a monstrous extension, for it is a plausible opinion that the self-immolation of the widow at her husband's funeral was an addition grafted on the primitive *sacra* under the influence of the impression, which always accompanies the idea of sacrifice, that human blood is the most precious of all oblations. With the Romans, on the contrary, the legal obligation and the religious duty have ceased to be blended. The necessity of solemnising the *sacra* forms no part of the theory of civil law, but they are under the separate jurisdiction of the College of Pontiffs.” In China political law and government have absorbed the religious.

The peculiarity of the laws will give to us valuable indications of the manner in which religion influenced society in those early days. The way in which a separation of the civil and moral laws from religion was accomplished is interesting to illustrate modern mental development. I have already given a few remarks on law in general (Chap. I.), and on the difference between religious and moral law (Chap. V.). Civil, or I may be permitted to say, *legal* law I take as the expression of the will of society, given by its representatives, *i.e.* by those in authority, to the individual members of a special society. As all three kinds of law are expressive of will or intention, and are given to direct the

* H. Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 187.

metaphysical conception under a legal aspect." This means order and definiteness of right and obligation. Where there is law among men there can be no more a mere aggregation of individuals, but there must be a somewhat organised society. This fact is too often overlooked in theories on law. As H. Maine is a writer of clear conception on this point, I take the liberty to give his view in full: he says, (p. 121) "Men are first seen distributed in perfectly insulated groups, held together by obedience to the parent. Law is the parent's word, but it is not yet in the condition of those *themistes* which were analysed in the first chapter in which these early legal conceptions show themselves as formed; we find that they still partake of the mystery and spontaneity which must have seemed to characterise a despotic father's commands, but that at the same time, inasmuch as they proceed from a sovereign, they presuppose a union of family groups in some wider organisation. The next question is, what is the nature of this union, and the degree of intimacy which it involves? It is just here that archaic law renders us one of the greatest of its services and fills up a gap which otherwise could only have been bridged by conjecture. It is full, in all its provinces, of the clearest indications that society in primitive times was not what it is assumed to be at present, a collection of *individuals*. In fact, and in the view of the men who composed it, it was an *aggregation of families*. The contrast may be most forcibly expressed by saying that the *unit* of an ancient society was the family, of a modern society the individual. We must be prepared to find in ancient law all the consequences of

this difference. It is so framed as to be adjusted to a system of small independent corporations. It is therefore scanty, because it is supplemented by the despotic commands of the heads of households. It is ceremonious, because the transactions to which it pays regard resemble international concerns much more than the quick play of intercourse between individuals. Above all it has a peculiarity of which the full importance cannot be shown at present. It takes a view of *life* wholly unlike any which appears in developed jurisprudence. Corporations *never die*, and accordingly primitive law considers the entities with which it deals, *i.e.* the patriarchal or family groups, as perpetual and inextinguishable. This view is closely allied to the peculiar aspect under which, in very ancient times, moral attributes present themselves. The moral elevation and moral debasement of the individual appear to be confounded with, or postponed to, the merits and offences of the group to which the individual belongs. If the community sins, its guilt is much more than the sum of the offences committed by its members; the crime is a corporate act, and extends in its consequences to many more persons than have shared in its actual perpetration. If, on the other hand, the individual is conspicuously guilty, it is his children, his kinsfolk, his tribesmen, or his fellow-citizens, who suffer with him, and sometimes for him. It thus happens that the ideas of moral responsibility and retribution often seem to be more clearly realised at very ancient than at more advanced periods, for, as the family group is immortal, and its liability to punishment indefinite, the primitive mind is not perplexed by the

questions which become troublesome as soon as the individual is conceived as altogether separate from the group. One step in the transition from the ancient and simple view of the matter to the theological or metaphysical explanation of later days is marked by the early Greek notion of an inherited curse. The bequest received by his posterity from the original criminal was not a liability to punishment, but a liability to the commission of fresh offences which drew with them a condign retribution; and thus the responsibility of the family was reconciled with the newer phase of thought which limited the consequences of crime to the person of the actual delinquent.*

It would be a very simple explanation of the origin of society if we could base a general conclusion on the hint furnished us by the Scriptural example already adverted to (the Patriarchs), and could suppose that communities began to exist wherever a family held together instead of separating at the death of its patriarchal chieftain. In most of the Greek States and in Rome there long remained the vestiges of an ascending series of groups out of which the State was at first constituted. The Family, House, and Tribe of the Romans may be taken as the type of them, and they are so described to us that we can scarcely help conceiving them as a system of concentric circles which have gradually expanded from the same point. The elementary group is the Family, connected by common subjection to the highest male ascendant. The

* These facts may be welcomed as the key to a satisfactory solution of the difficulties in connection with the Christian doctrine of hereditary sin.

aggregation of Families forms the Gens or House. The aggregation of Houses makes the Tribe. The aggregation of Tribes constitutes the commonwealth.* Are we at liberty to follow these indications, and to lay down that the commonwealth is a collection of persons united by common descent from the progenitor of an original family? Of this we may at least be certain, that all ancient societies regarded themselves as having proceeded from one original stock, and even laboured under an incapacity for comprehending any reason except this for their holding together in political union. The history of political ideas begins, in fact, with the assumption that kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of community in political functions." Such a view, based on solid facts, which can be multiplied from ancient Chinese history, is the more important and enjoyable as almost all writers on natural law, *jus naturalis*, have made the mistake of considering man *in abstracto* and the relations between men in the same light. The result could be nothing but an abstract notion of what is natural (state of nature) and of what is right, and hence laws so abstract that they could lead fanatic adherents to revolution and abrogation of positive laws, but could never qualify them to establish those laws in society with any positive results.

"The philosophers of France, in their eagerness to escape from what they deemed a superstition of

* This was exactly the case in ancient China. Even from the beginning of the Chow dynasty down to the present day we see in Chinese history principally a contest of different Gens or Houses.

the priests, flung themselves headlong into a superstition of the lawyers Those are few who will deny that it helped most powerfully to bring about the grosser disappointments of which the first French revolution was fertile. It gave birth, or intense stimulus, to the vices of mental habit all but universal at the time, disdain of positive law, impatience of experience, and the preference of *à priori* to all other reasoning. In proportion too as this philosophy fixes its grasp on minds which have thought less than others and fortified themselves with smaller observation, its tendency is to become distinctly anarchical.”* It is important to be on our guard in this respect. Some more carefulness is especially needed when the original form of States is brought under consideration. No State is a mere aggregation of individuals, nor is it even an organisation of such individuals. A State is the unit of an organised society, an organisation of many organisations. It is not a number of families which combine to form a State, such united families form a clan, if of the same descent, a community if of different surnames; but the union of several clans or communities may be the beginning of a State as soon as the different organisations are organised again so to make up each other’s deficiencies and become in this way members of a greater body.† “Even

* H. Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 87.

† “It is almost a necessary habit of thought to regard the State as a moral being, possessed of a will, a conscience, and moral responsibility.” *The Science of Law* (p. 404) by Sheldon Amos. “The idea of the State is the realization of the universal man in the individual form of a people.” A. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, §151.

ancient Law knows next to nothing of Individuals. It is concerned not with Individuals, but with Families, not with single human beings but groups. Even when the law of the State has succeeded in permeating the small circles of kindred into which it had originally no means of penetrating, the view it takes of Individuals is curiously different from that taken by jurisprudence in its maturest stage. The life of each citizen is not regarded as limited by birth and death, it is but a continuation of the existence of his forefathers, and it will be prolonged in the existence of his descendants." Every man when born in the world is not born as an abstract man, but either as male or as female, and has thus already designed to him a special sphere of life. Men do not grow on trees, nor are they produced from the ground, but they are born as babies and have to be nursed and educated by their parents. We cannot choose our own parents, but have simply to submit to their care and authority. Mr. Maine says (p. 309) "I feel sure that power over children was the root of the old conception of power."*

We see at once the great difference between the members of a family—male and female—parents and children—old ones and young ones. Any theory of law that pays no regard to such natural differences is mere nonsense.

Between different families we see other differences in health, beauty, skill, intelligence, moral qualities, etc. Such are the natural causes which establish vari-

* Ancient Law, p. 250.

ous ranks of superiors and inferiors. Every one in authority in the world has obtained his power by some superiority which he had above others, and which became acknowledged by some at least of his fellow-men. The propagation of authority has, however, too often been different from its foundation. But it matters little to us who keeps the highest authority of a State, as we only wish to find out the relation religion takes in the organisation of each State. I say of each State, for there has never been a State without religion.

We have, however, to distinguish private and public religion, or, better, the religious functions in private life and those in public life. The worship of individuals bears a very different character from that offered by the functionaries of a State. Everybody knows this to be the case in China even to the present day. What kind of religious worship is commanded by the State under consideration, and how is it performed? Were and are the subjects at liberty to worship *what* they please and *how* they please, or are they forced to follow the State-religion? Who are the principal functionaries of the religion? If they are not officials, what is their relation to the government? Has religion any kind of organization acknowledged or not by the government? How far is religion independent of the State, and where is it subject to common law? What religious offences are punished as crimes? We know that our modern legislation is different in this respect from the ancient. "It is also true that the non-Christian bodies of archaic law entail penal consequences on certain classes of acts and on cer-

tain classes of omissions, as being violations of divine jurisprudence and commands. The law administered at Athens by the Senate of Areopagus was probably a special religious code, and at Rome, apparently from a very early period, the Pontifical jurisprudence punished adultery, sacrilege, and perhaps murder. There were therefore in the Athenian and in the Roman States laws punishing *sins*. There were also laws punishing *torts*. The conception of offence against God produced the first class of ordinances, the conception of offence against one's neighbour produced the second, but the idea of offence against the State or aggregate community did not at first produce a true *criminal* jurisprudence.*

What functions of religion are considered legal and thence binding by the State government? I mention for example marriage, oath, etc. As it is not yet generally known that an oath, or any other religious ceremony, very often was the proper form for a contract, I quote again a passage from H. Maine (p. 303), "Ancient law is still more suggestive of the distance which separates the crude form of contract from its maturity. At first, nothing is seen like the interposition of law to compel the performance of a promise. That which the law arms with its sanctions is not a promise, but a promise, accompanied with a solemn ceremonial. Not only are the formalities of equal importance with the promise itself, but they are, if anything, of greater importance. No pledge is enforced if a single form be omitted or mis-

* H. Maine, p. 359.

placed, but, on the other hand, if the forms can be shown to have been accurately proceeded with, it is of no avail to plead that the promise was made under duress or deception."

Other questions which must be treated, are: Has religion been the cause of political difficulties, and how? Have there been persecutions of religion by the State, and why? Is a religion confined to one State or spread over several countries? What are the principal means of propagation? Are the members of the same religion in different countries in some connection with each other, and how? Are there several religions in the same State? And what are the laws respecting them?

"Religion* is still a powerful and perhaps, on the whole, the most powerful influence, both in the conduct of the life of individual persons and in the construction of corporate societies which are highly organised in themselves, and possess all the solidity and strength derivable from intense intellectual convictions and highly-wrought emotional fervour. But these associated bodies of persons are in many States numerous; and in no modern State are they capable of being reduced to one or two. Thus, admitting that groups of this sort, like the other groups already alluded to, are natural elements in the composition of the State, it is still a difficult problem to decide the exact measure of support and control they should severally meet with at the hands of law.†

* The Science of Law, by Sheldon Amos, M.A., p. 134 ff.

† Prof. Bluntschli, *Allgemeines Statsrecht*, 3rd Ed. Vol. II. p. 259, ff., distinguishes clearly between religion and church. He

“In some important respects these religious bodies differ from the other groups, family, village, parochial, county, and borough—which have been previously adverted to as affording subject matter for law. Religious bodies almost invariably co-exist only by forced efforts of mutual toleration, while all the other bodies co-exist apart from all necessary thought of rivalry or antipathy. The existence of any single family, village, or country presupposes, almost as of necessity, the existence of a number of others. Everything is prepared for mutual help and co-operation, and these only lack the stimulating presence of law to discover for each its true relations to all the rest, and to the State.

“Religious bodies, on the contrary, for the most part, subsist, in theory, by the exclusion of one another. Their mutual condemnation of each other’s opinions and practices may be smoothed over in practical life, through the personal virtues of members or pre-eminent leaders of the several societies. But toleration, at the best, can only be looked for as a precious growth requiring the most anxious culture, and by no means as an essential and natural condition.

“If these religious societies have to be brought into that relation with the State into which it is the peculiar function of law to bring all the groups into which the members of the community spontaneously organise themselves, there are only a limited number

regards religion essentially independent of the State, but treats in detail two questions:—1. How is the legal relation of the State to the religious life of individuals? 2. How is its relation to the existence and life of religious communities, churches and sects?

of courses to be adopted, between which a selection must be made. Thus, law may select for its peculiar patronage a certain number of these societies according to their respective claims as grounded on the number and wealth of their adherents, on the antiquity of their pretensions, or on the apparent usefulness and truthfulness of their tenets. This patronage may be exhibited in conceding exemptions from general civil burdens to the ministers of the religious body favoured; in supplementing the salaries of the ministers from public funds; or in according a peculiar amount of protection to the property vested in the body.

“Or again, law may select for its peculiar patronage one body out of all the rest, such body being chosen on the ground of its past history in relation to the general history of the country, the selection of it being presumptively justified by its present size and influence. The patronage in this last case is likely to assume a more decided form than in the former cases, and those phenomena are produced which are exhibited in England. The Queen or King must necessarily be a member of this Church. All the chief ministers of this Church are members of one branch of the legislature. All the formularies of public worship are fixed by Act of Parliament. All breaches of ecclesiastical duty are cognizable in special courts of justice constituted by the State for this purpose. All the chief ministers of the Church, and a vast number of the subordinate ministers are appointed by the executive government of the day. This is what is meant by saying that the Church of England is established. It is obvious that “establishment” will have

a different meaning for every country, and for the same country at different epochs in its history.

“A third method that law may adopt is to show complete neutrality with respect to all religious bodies, only treating them in the same way as other corporate bodies which are organized for any purely secular purpose. In this way, their rights of ownership would be fully protected and the mutual liabilities of their ministers and congregations defined by the general law of contract. Certain supplementary laws, again, may provide for the special registration of bodies fulfilling certain conditions, the result of which will be the concession of privileges to their ministers for the performance of certain important public ceremonies, as marriages, and for the assurance of quiet and order in the performance of public worship.

“Which of these methods* a State will adopt, for the strengthening and regulation of the religious bodies which assist in its own composition, will depend as much upon the actual condition of the country as determined by its previous history, as upon conceptions of ideal perfection or even of immediate expediency.”

There is another point yet to be mentioned in connection with State-life—that is, *progress* and its relation to religion. I quote again H. Maine, (p. 71), “The tendency to look not to the past but to the future for types of perfection was brought into the world by Christianity. Ancient literature gives few or

* Dr. Hermann Ulrici, in his “Grundzuege der praktischen Philosophie, Naturrecht, Ethik und Aesthetik,” says (Vol. I. p. 486), “The State has to connect itself with religion and religiousness, but to separate itself from churches and denominations.”

no hints of a belief that the progress of society is necessarily from worse to better." On Mahomedanism I just happen to see a different remark. "No Moslem* can lift up his voice in condemnation, of polygamy, slavery, murder, religious war, and religious persecution, without condemning the Prophet himself, and being cut off from the body of the Faithful. The Moslem may concede to the prejudices of the Giaour, and institute so-called reforms, or even set up a seemingly liberal constitution; but at heart he must, and does, remain the same as ever." Similar things may be said of the Prophets of other religions, but not of Christ.

I give here as an appendix what in our own time is understood by religious liberty.†

1.—The *jus confessionis*, the right to set up one's own confession of faith, provided that it contains nothing against the reverence to God, the obedience to the laws, the loyalty to the State and the peace with the fellow-citizens.

2.—The *jus sacrorum*, the regulation of public worship, liturgies, etc.

3.—The *jus sacerdotii*, examination, ordination and appointment of ministers.

4.—The *jus regiminis*, the organisation of the constitution and corresponding administration.

5.—The *jus instructionis religiosæ*, to give reli-

* See *Saturday Review*, 1878, p. 150.

† See Herzog's *Real-Encyklopædie*, Vol. XII.

A concise compendium of Ecclesiastical Law in force in Germany is given by *Julius Bender* in his *Repetitorium des gesammten gemeinen Rechts*, 1875, p. 365-398.

gious instruction. The father has the right to determine the religious education of his children.

6.—The *jus disciplinæ*, the right of religious discipline, provided no civil penalties are inflicted.

7.—The *jus jurisdictionis religiosæ*, the right of jurisdiction in inner religious matters.

8.—The *jus patrimonis*, the right of property, but subject to the civil laws regarding acquisition of property, etc.

We see here a great field open for students of laws and politics, as well as for students of the Science of religion.

VII.

RELIGION AND CIVILIZATION.

Many explanations are given of the meaning of civilization. I do not wish here to enter into any learned expositions, but shall take civilization as simply relating to *manners*. A man is civil if his manners are more or less refined and obliging—not rude and repulsive. Nations are called civilized if their manners in peace and war show, as far as possible, a benevolent not a malevolent spirit, and if there is some order in what they do. It is now generally taken for granted that there is no nation in the world without some kind of religion, but there are many

nations and tribes said to be without civilization. We see, however, at once that we cannot speak of any human beings as absolutely without civilization, *i. e.* without any good manners. In so far as man is above a mere vegetating life, and as he is different from brutes, he is civilized.* The human mind exerts more or less influence over human passions. Civilization differs according to the degrees of this influence. The motives by which the mind is moved to restrain the passions and bring other agents into play, may again differ very widely. If a stranger, cast by a storm on the shore of a foreign country, is not killed by the natives but treated kindly, it may be from fear of the gods, from fear of revenge by men, or from fear of the laws of the country, yet it may be from a feeling of sympathy or from something else, it is certainly a sign of civilization. Some nations, as the Chinese, are also called half-civilized. They are called so because acts of brutality are nearly as frequent as those of benevolence, the manners are civil to a great extent towards their own people, especially of the influential classes, but towards foreigners and unprotected persons they show rude and barbarous manners. It is also true when we compare their manners in war etc. with the manners under the same circumstances in

* Oscar Peschel, *Völkerkunde*, says, "Even a fraction of mankind is yet to be discovered without a more or less rich Vocabulary and Grammar, without artificially sharpened weapons and various implements (vessels) and without the knowledge of making fire." Sir John Lubbock's statement is then refuted. See p. 139 ff., third Edition.

Prof. T. G. Müller, *Geschichte der Americanischen Urreligionen*, distinguishes between "Kulturvölker und Wilde," and thinks (p. 15) the difference in food and labour between them essential and determinative.

Christian countries. Those countries which are commonly called uncivilized exhibit again a great variety in their manners. We find, generally speaking, that no nation, nor any tribe, nor even any individual, altogether conform in their manners to another nation or tribe or individual. Human manners show as much variation as the leaves of trees. We may, however, discover some general forms or types in the peculiarities of manners as in the shape of leaves, and thus form larger groups.

The origin of any kind of manners may be from various sources, and points, in many instances, to the remotest antiquity of a people. Some of these manners may be the results of the morality of the people; all manners, however, show the peculiarity of the sentiments of the human heart. As religion especially and primarily acts on the sentiments of man we see at once the close relation of the religion of a people to their manners, that is, to their civilization. The subject has, however, not yet been properly investigated, and all writers, therefore, who have not yet felt the influence of religion in their heart and from thence upon their own manners show a disposition either to deny such an influence or to misrepresent it. I take up for an example a very able and erudite writer of our time, Mr. Henry Thomas Buckle.*

Mr. Buckle seems to exclude altogether the religious factor from civilization;† he says, "This double

* History of Civilization in England, third Edit., Vol. I., p. 159, ff.

† "The character of religion in national and moral respects is of the greatest influence on the whole mental and partly on the economical state of things"—is the opinion of a statesman of

movement, moral and intellectual, is essential to the very idea of civilization and includes the entire theory of mental progress. To be willing to perform our duty is the moral part; to know how to perform it is the intellectual part; while the closer these two parts are knit together, the greater the harmony with which they work; and the more accurately the means are adopted to the end, the more completely will the scheme of our life be accomplished, and the more securely shall we lay the foundation for the further advancement of mankind.

“Whatever the moral and intellectual progress of men may be, it resolves itself not into a progress of natural capacity but into a progress, if I may so say, of opportunity; that is, an improvement in the circumstances under which that capacity after birth comes into play. Here, then, lies the gist of the whole matter. The progress is one, not of internal power, but of external advantage.

“On this account it is evident, that if we look at mankind in the aggregate, their moral and intellectual conduct is regulated by the moral and intellectual notions prevalent in their own time. There are of course, many persons who will rise above those notions, and many others who will sink below them. But such cases are exceptional, and form a very small proportion of the total amount of those who are nowise

deepest learning and much experience. See Robert von Mohl *Encyklopædie der Staatswissenschaften*, 1859, p. 24. “The personal foundation of Morality goes back into religion.” Ad. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, §171.

Compare also the article “The Social Influence of Christianity” in *Saturday Review*, 1878, p. 240, ff.

remarkable either for good or for evil. An immense majority of men must always remain in a middle state, neither very foolish nor very able, neither very virtuous nor very vicious, but slumbering on in a peaceful and decent mediocrity, adopting without much difficulty the current opinions of the day, making no inquiry, exciting no scandal, causing no wonder, just holding themselves on a level with their generation, and noiselessly conforming to the standard of morals and of knowledge common to the age and country in which they live.

“Now, it requires but a superficial acquaintance with history to be aware that this standard is constantly changing, and that it is never precisely the same even in the most similar countries, or in two successive generations in the same country. The opinions which are popular in any nation, vary in many respects almost from year to year; and what in one period is attacked as a paradox or a heresy, is in another period welcomed as a sober truth; which, however, in its turn is replaced by some subsequent novelty. This extreme mutability in the ordinary standard of human actions, shows that the conditions on which the standard depends must themselves be very mutable, and those conditions, whatever they may be, are evidently the originators of the moral and intellectual conduct of the great average of mankind.

“Applying this test to moral motives, or to the dictates of what is called moral instinct, we shall at once see how extremely small is the influence those motives have exercised over the progress of civili-

zation. For there is, unquestionably, nothing to be found in the world which has undergone so little change as those great dogmas of which moral systems are composed. To do good to others; to sacrifice for their benefit your own wishes; to love your neighbour as yourself; to forgive your enemies; to restrain your passions; to honour your parents; to respect those who are set over you: these, and a few others, are the sole essentials of morals; but they have been known for thousands of years, and not one jot or tittle has been added to them by all the sermons, homilies, and text-books which moralists and theologians have been able to produce.

“But if we contrast this stationary aspect of moral truths with the progressive aspect of intellectual truths, the difference is indeed startling. All the great moral systems which have exercised much influence, have been fundamentally the same; all the great intellectual systems have been fundamentally different. In reference to our moral conduct, there is not a single principle now known to the most cultivated Europeans, which was not likewise known to the ancients. In reference to the conduct of our intellect, the moderns have not only made the most important additions to every department of knowledge that the ancients ever attempted to study, but besides this, they have upset and revolutionized the old methods of inquiry; they have consolidated into one great scheme all those resources of induction which Aristotle alone dimly perceived; and they have created sciences, the faintest idea of which never entered the mind of the boldest thinker antiquity produced.

“These are, to every educated man, recognised and notorious facts; and the inference to be drawn from them is immediately obvious. Since civilization is the product of moral and intellectual agencies, and since that product is constantly changing, it evidently cannot be regulated by the stationary agent; because, when surrounding circumstances are unchanged, a stationary agent can only produce a stationary effect. The only other agent is the intellectual one; and that this is the real mover may be proved in two distinct ways: first, because being, as we have already seen, either moral or intellectual, and being, as we have also seen, not moral, it must be intellectual; and secondly, because the intellectual principle has an activity and a capacity for adaptation, which, as I undertake to show, is quite sufficient to account for the extraordinary progress that, during several centuries, Europe has continued to make.”*

Mr. Buckle shows us here his fundamental mistake. The great moral systems of different nations and times have been as much the same and as much different as the intellectual systems. Or, will Mr. Buckle prove that the *nature* and the *laws* of our intellect have been changed? Certainly not. Mr. Buckle even must know from his comprehensive learning that

* “But this is to reduce history to a sum in arithmetic. History is a living process. Its factors are dynamic, and are not to be pulled apart like dead bones or a heap of sticks. These ethical forces are “unchanging,” only in the sense of being constant and unfailing; and the mental growth, which clears their vision and develops their practical capacities, in fact enables them to exert an ever-increasing influence, a completer fulfilment of their own ideal.”—S. Johnson against Buckle in *Oriental Religions*, Vol. I. p. 17.

no new *ideas* have been added to our knowledge, exactly in the same sense as none have come to our morality. All ideas of the most refined philosophy of our modern time can be traced in the sentences of the philosophers of the most primitive ages.* The main difference between the past and present state is nevertheless quite obvious; what formerly was only a glimpse of truth has now become a principle of life, what was sporadic has become general, what was momentary has become permanent. Though we speak of new ideas which come forth, or say, even more incorrectly, that they are created at such and such a time, such ideas have then, in fact, only got the ascendancy above others. In all cases it can be shown by careful investigation that all such so-called new ideas have been under the surface of public opinion long before. Our knowledge of *details of inner and outer experience* has, however, in the course of time had the most remarkable additions, and by it, or rather by the proper use of it, our dominion over the powers of nature has become more extended and more effective. We see here the difference between *theoretical and practical knowledge*, and we have the same between moral ideas and *practical moral life, moral laws* and the *manners* of people. I ask Mr. Buckle, are not the manners of

* G. H. Lewes in the conclusion to his *Biographical History of Philosophy* says, "There are two characteristics of Modern Philosophy which may here be briefly touched on. The first is the progressive development of positive science, which in ancient speculations occupied the subordinate rank, and which now occupies the highest. The second is the reproduction of all the questions which agitated the Greeks, and that too in a similar course of development. Not only are the questions similar, but their evolutions are so."

different nations changed now compared with former centuries? Of course they are, but Mr. Buckle maintains that these changes have been effectuated not by moral agencies but by intellectual. Did Mr. Buckle not know that the most intellectual periods in the history of nations have been the most corrupt in morals? Athens, Rome, France give ample proofs. Regarding the moral accomplishments of our time I ask, has slavery been abolished by persuasion of intellectual knowledge or by the promptings of moral feelings? Is war conducted now in a more humane way than before because we have made the new discoveries in science or because our moral feelings are higher in that respect? Are prisoners now treated better from intellectual or from moral motives? All those various benevolent institutions of our age, has our intellectual progress established them, or our advanced benevolent sympathy with the sufferings of our fellow-men? Certainly the latter. A historian ought besides to have so much experience of real human life as to know that onesided intellectual culture makes man heartless and selfish. Mr. Th. Dick* is drawing a lively picture of the manners of our modern society; we are sorry that men of great intellectual culture form no exception to it. "It would be inconsistent," Mr. Dick says, "with the limited plan of this work, to attempt to trace the principle of malignity through all the scenes of social, commercial, and domestic life. Were I to enter into details of filial impiety, ingratitude, and rebellion—of faithless friendships, of the alienations of affection, and

* Philosophy of Religion, p. 151.

of the unnatural contentions between brothers and sisters—of the abominable *selfishness* which appears in the general conduct and transactions of mankind—of the bitterness, the fraud, and the perjury, with which law suits are commenced and prosecuted—of the hatred, malice, and resentment, manifested for injuries real or supposed—of the frauds daily committed in every department of the commercial world—of the shufflings and base deceptions which are practised in cases of bankruptcy—of the slanders, the caballing, and the falsehood, which attend electioneering contests—of the envy, malice, and resentment displayed between competitors for office and power—of the haughtiness and insolence displayed by petty tyrants both in church and state—of the selfishness and injustice of corporate bodies, and the little regard they show for the interests of those who are oppressed, and deprived of their rewards—of the gluttony, drunkenness, and prodigality, which so generally prevail—of the brawlings, fightings, and contentions, which are daily presented to the view in taverns, ale-houses, and dram-shops, and the low slang and vulgar abuse with which such scenes are intermingled—of the seductions accomplished by insidious artfulness and outrageous perjury—of the multiplied falsehoods of all descriptions which are uttered in courts, in camps, and in private dwellings—of the unblushing lies of public newspapers, and the perjuries of office—of the systematic frauds and robberies by which a large portion of the community are cheated out of their property and their rights—of the pride, haughtiness, and oppression of the rich, and of the malice, envy, and discontentment of the poor,—such

pictures of malignity might be presented to the view, as would fill the mind of the reader with astonishment and horror, and which would require a series of volumes to record the revolting details." Such is the reverse of Mr. Buckle's shield.* Mr. Buckle brings even a serious charge against moral excellence (p. 166); he says, "Indeed, if we examine the effects of the most active philanthropy, and of the largest and most disinterested kindness, we shall find that those effects are comparatively speaking, short lived; that there is only a small number of individuals they come in contact with and benefit; that they rarely survive the generation which witnessed their commencement; and that, when they take the more durable form of founding great public charities, such institutions invariably fall, first into abuse, then into decay, and after a time are either destroyed, or perverted from their original intentions, mocking the effort by which it is vainly attempted to perpetuate the memory even of the purest and most energetic benevolence.

"These conclusions are no doubt very unpalatable; and what makes them peculiarly offensive is, that it is impossible to refute them (?). For the deeper

* *F. C. Bluntschli*, in "Geschichte des Allgemeinen Statsrechts und der Politik," p. 653, says, "Mr. Buckle's remarkable book shows the uncertainty and deception of the conclusions to which a one-sided imitation of the naturalistic-scientific method leads in the sphere of history. As Hegel formerly treated history as a logical-dialectic process, so Mr. Buckle considers history as an effect of natural necessity, and he gives his proofs like examples of arithmetic from statistical tables. But it seems a mockery of the fundamental scientific idea if Hegel, starting from self-conscious thought and volition finally comes to mere preservation of the existing state of things, and Mr. Buckle, starting from ponderable and countable material, shows himself a zealous representative of social progress and mental liberty."

we penetrate into this question, the more clearly shall we see the superiority of intellectual acquisitions over moral feeling. There is no instance on record of an ignorant man who, having good intentions, and supreme power to enforce them, has not done far more evil than good. And whenever the intentions have been very eager, and the power very extensive, the evil has been enormous." And page 167, "It is an undoubted fact that an overwhelming majority of religious persecutors have been men of the purest intentions, of the most admirable and unsullied morals. It is impossible that this should be otherwise. For they are not bad intentioned men, who seek to enforce opinions which they believe to be good. Still less are they bad men, who are so regardless of temporal considerations as to employ all the resources of their power, not for their own benefit, but for the purpose of propagating a religion which they think necessary to the future happiness of mankind. Such men as these are not bad, they are only ignorant, ignorant of the nature of truth, ignorant of the consequences of their own acts. But in a moral point of view, their motives are unimpeachable. Indeed, it is the very ardour of their sincerity which warms them into persecution. It is the holy zeal by which they are fired, that quickens their fanaticism into a deadly activity.* If you can impress any man

* Greediness, without religion, has, however, ever been the worst of all evil causes. The Portuguese gave infected clothes to the Brazilians, Americans poisoned wells with Strychnin, wives of settlers in Australia mixed Arsenic among flour for hungry natives, settlers in Tasmania shot natives to feed their dogs. See Oscar Peschel *Völkerkunde*, p. 154, where the proofs will be found.

with an absorbing conviction of the supreme importance of some moral or religious doctrine; if you can make him believe that those who reject that doctrine are doomed to eternal perdition; if you then give that man power, and by means of his ignorance blind him to the ulterior consequences of his own acts, he will infallibly persecute those who deny his doctrine, and the extent of his persecution will be regulated by the extent of his sincerity."

Is it not strange that Mr. Buckle refutes himself in his very charge without becoming aware of the fact? Is some moral or religious *doctrine* equal to morality or religion? A doctrine is always a product of the intellect. If Mr. Buckle would investigate all persecutions without prejudice from metaphysical dogmas he could find, that most of them have been instigated certainly not from moral, nor from religious, but from political and other motives. That the severest persecutors were men of the most admirable and unsullied morals is no objection to us, but shows that those persecutors were able to carry out their principles, that all their feelings were under the *control of their intellect* and because they saw *some reason* for putting down any discord or schism in state or church by all means in their power. Never were heretics burnt to save *their* souls, but to save the church from pollution and the state from contenting parties. The Roman Emperors never persecuted the Christians from moral motives to make them better men, but from political considerations and to keep men as their own worshippers. We must not forget that religion very often only gives the welcome name to certain actions, but

that those in power commonly have quite other aims and motives.

One of the most dangerous factors in human history, however, is the *influence of theories* (intellect) upon human actions. It is not necessary that the theories are wrong in themselves, but their application may be so, and the generalization of a partly true theory is always mischievous. If Mr. Buckle had spared a few hours to read Roman history over again he would have found that not the most ignorant emperors have been the severest persecutors, but the wisest philosophers, as Marcus Aurelius and Julian. Did Mr. Buckle not know that Rousseau, this hero of modern intellectual civilization, interdicts by penalty of death every other except his own national religion in his (utopian) state? * In a prize essay for the academy at Dijon† Rousseau asserts the necessity to annihilate civilization, arts and science, and if this should be impossible, to come as near as possible to it. Reflection, Rousseau says, is something against nature; a man who meditates is a depraved animal, “un animal dépravé.” Has ever a religious man used such language? ! Voltaire’s “écrasez l’infâme” is well known.

Many complaints, and as I think very just ones, may constantly be heard on the cruelty of religious persecutions. It is a pity, however, that nobody seems to remember the far *more cruel legal prosecutions* of all times and countries. These are certainly not the fault of religion, nor of morals, but of the feelings of

* See the last chapter of Rousseau’s “*Contrat Social*.”

† Quoted in *Naturgenuss*, von H. Lorm, Berlin, 1876.

the higher classes of society who thought such proceedings necessary.

“The following is a brief summary of the principal punishments that have been adopted by men, in different countries, for tormenting and destroying each other. Capital punishments: beheading, strangling, crucifixion, drowning, burning, roasting, hanging by the neck, the arm, or the leg; starving, sawing, exposing to wild beasts, rending asunder by horses drawing opposite ways, shooting, burying alive, blowing from the mouth of a cannon, compulsory deprivation of sleep, rolling on a barrel stuck with nails, cutting to pieces, hanging by the ribs, poisoning, pressing slowly to death by a weight laid on the breast; casting headlong from a rock, tearing out the bowels, pulling to pieces with red hot pincers, stretching on the rack, breaking on the wheel, impaling, flaying alive, cutting out the heart, etc., etc. Punishments short of death have been such as the following: Fine, pillory, imprisonment, compulsory labour at the mines, galleys, highways, or correction-house; whipping, bastinadoing, mutilation by cutting away the ears, the nose, the tongue, the breasts of women, the foot, the hand; squeezing the marrow from the bones with screws or wedges; castration, putting out the eyes; banishment, running the gauntlet, drumming, shaving off the hair, burning on the hand or forehead; and many others of similar nature. Could the ingenuity of the inhabitants of Tophet have invented punishments more cruel and revolting? Has any one of these modes of punishment a tendency to reform the criminal, and promote his happiness? On

the contrary, have they not all a direct tendency to irritate, to harden, and to excite feelings of revenge? Nothing shows *the malevolent dispositions* of a great portion of the human race, in so striking a light, as the punishments they have inflicted on one another; for these are characteristic not of insulated individuals only, but of nations, in their collective capacity.”*

Another Buckle could write an entertaining and useful book if he would investigate the relation of the inflicted punishments to the real crimes. It would probably appear above doubt that few courts of the world, if any, are clean from innocent blood. The causes of it may, however, differ very much in different cases, but they will seldom be found to be merely intellectual in the sense of not knowing better, but some purpose, *i.e. will*, may be at the bottom of such transactions, which the person in question may or may not regard as good. Such another Buckle would doubtlessly see, that the intellect has to move the desires or the will of man, *i.e.* it must enter the Moral sphere in order to become active in the outer world. The intellect, however, with all its power, is too often only the obedient servant of a person's emotions or will. Nearly all great statesmen are proofs of this doctrine.

It would be a very interesting task to write a history of the evils and crimes evolved from political and other *theories*. To what atrocities and barbarous dealings have certain financial theories induced some of our most enlightened governments! Immoral mea-

* See Beccaria's "Essay on Crimes and Punishments," p. 52, 56, quoted by Thomas Dick in "The Philosophy of Religion."

asures have also been the result of the highly-praised politico-economical theories on over-population. All such theories were regarded as highest wisdom at one time, or at least by a certain class of men. As theories they are commonly supported by some facts, but other facts in contradiction therewith are either ignored or cannot yet be known. Life, especially in society, is never uniform but ever variegated; the best theories only help for a time and to a certain extent, then they become obsolete, and the most fortunate thing that can happen to them is to be buried in oblivion or in the volumes of large libraries. If one looks closely into the most prevalent superstitions of any country in the world, one finds that many are nothing but survivals of obsolete theories, and that almost all religious, political and not less the scientific persecutions are based on wrong theories of the present or of the past times. Mr. Buckle is quite right in saying that enlightenment of the intellect is for such things the most appropriate remedy. I do not at all underrate the power of intellect and its great influence upon human welfare. Yet I am sure Mr. Buckle much *overrates* this influence and has read it *into* history but not from it, *i.e.* Mr. Buckle got his first principles not inductively from historical facts, but he construed the facts in accordance with his metaphysical rules.

“It is evident,” Mr. Buckle says in another place, p. 232, “that if a people were left entirely to themselves their religion, their literature, and their government would be, not the causes of their civilization, but the effects of it.” This sentence is not clear. Mr. Buckle

certainly knows that religion is not produced by civilization. I think the true meaning of the passage must be, civilization changes or modifies the appearance or state of religion among a nation. "It is of course true," Mr. Buckle continues, "that a good religion is favourable to civilization, and a bad one unfavourable to it. Unless, however, there is some interference from without, no people will ever discover that their religion is bad, until their reason tells them so, but if their reason is inactive, and their knowledge stationary, the discovery will never be made . . ." Of course not: mere animals have no religious life, but the slumbering faculties of men may be aroused by a shock to the feelings sooner and better than by intellectual reasoning. Schiller thinks "hunger and love" more powerful than philosophy for keeping the world in order. "The truth is, that the religious opinions (opinions are of course caused by the intellect) which prevail in any period, are among the symptoms by which that period is marked. When the opinions are deeply rooted, they do, no doubt, influence the conduct of men, but before they can be deeply rooted, some intellectual change must first have taken place . . . * After a careful study of the history and condition of barbarous nations, I do most confidently assert, that there is no well-attested case of any people being permanently converted to Christianity, except in those

* Not consistent with this passage is another, p. 226, "While there is no country which possesses a more original, inquisitive, and innovating literature than Scotland does, so also is there no country, equally civilized, in which so much of the spirit of the Middle Ages still lingers, in which so many absurdities are still believed, and in which it would be so easy to rouse into activity the old feelings of religious intolerance."

very few instances where missionaries, being men of knowledge, as well as men of piety, have familiarized the savage with habits of thought, and, by thus stimulating his intellect, have prepared him for the reception of those religious principles, which, without such stimulus, he could never have understood."

I perfectly agree with Mr. Buckle, if he allows me to change his beloved word "intellect"* for the far better term "mind." The mind must be changed, then people are converted. No devoted missionary, however, would feel satisfied to change only the habits of thought of any people. We think it of little use if any person can reproduce a compendium of Christian theology. As to orthodox thinkers, the middle age, as well as the 17th and 18th centuries, have had plenty of them. Mr. Buckle as a historian ought to have known something of these facts, also, that there have

* The word "intellect" is used by Mr. Buckle in a very vague sense. To convince the reader of this I give here the definition of it by A. Bain, "Mind and Body," p. 82:—" *Intellect* has long been divided into a variety of functions, or modes of operating, called faculties, under such names as Memory, Reason, Judgment, Imagination, Conception, and others; which, however, are not fundamentally distinct processes, but merely different applications of the collective forces of the Intelligence. We have no power of Memory in radical separation from the power of Reason or the power of Imagination. The classification is tainted with the fault called, in Logic, cross-division. The really fundamental separation of the powers of the Intellect is into three facts, called (1) *Discrimination*, the Sense, Feeling, or Consciousness of Difference; (2) *Similarity*, the Sense, Feeling, or Consciousness of Agreement; and (3) *Retentiveness*, or the power of Memory or Acquisition. These three functions, however much they are mingled, and inseparably mingled, in our mental operations, are yet totally distinct properties, and each the groundwork of a different superstructure. As an ultimate analysis of the mental powers, their number cannot be increased or diminished; fewer would not explain the facts, more are unnecessary. They are the Intellect, the whole Intellect, and nothing but the Intellect."

been perhaps among all nations and in different times so-called "mystics" and "pietists" in opposition to those most correct thinkers (intellectual machines, if you allow the expression). Mystics give a prominence to feeling, pietists to practical life, ritualists to forms, only the orthodox to pure doctrines, *i.e.* intellect. But there remains yet the most important thing to be mentioned, the notion and power of *conscience*, altogether, it seems, unknown to Mr. Buckle. All religions appeal more to conscience than to other faculties of the human nature. Through conscience religion acts on mind and body, on the inner and outer life.* We want to see *new manners in every department of human life*. Christian conversion makes man sober, pure, not only in his actions, but also in language and imagination; benevolent, not only to friends but even to foes, etc. Old inveterate habits are, however, not annihilated in one moment. This fact is too often overlooked. Passions which have been fostered before may break out again, yet, where the conversion is genuine, the tendency of the whole life, the bent of the mind, the aim of the will, the motives of the feelings, have another direction than before, and will keep the ascendancy above the lower desires. If we read good biographies of converted men, or observe the life men of real piety live, and compare it with what they have been and have done before their conversion, then the influence of the Christian religion upon the manners of individuals will become manifest beyond doubt.

* Compare A. Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, §§38 and 39.

"The Romans were," Mr. Buckle says, p. 237, "with rare exceptions, dissolute, and cruel. For such a people, Polytheism was the natural creed." The confessions of Augustin show us the power of the Christian religion to reform the manners of a most dissolute Roman. Whether society is changed and to what extent it is, depends, of course, on the relation of such single cases to the conduct of other individuals which compose society, and it may depend upon other circumstances, as laws, institutions, etc. "All that among us is called culture, among the Romance peoples civilization, arises out of the reciprocal action of the Individual on the Community, and of the Community on the Individual. Culture is the result of the individual's living for the community in which he is placed. The condition of this reciprocal influence is voluntary self-limitation; the barbarian, the uncivilized man, is he who recognizes no restraining limits. The real living root of all voluntary self-limitation is the principle which we call *piety*;—the practical recognition that the True, the Beautiful and the Good ought not to subserve us, and our selfish ends, but that they stand above us, demanding sacred reverence; reverence in their Ideal, that is, in God; reverence in their manifestation, that is, in every human soul wherein He has implanted them."* I leave the subject here, however, as I hope I have set forth my idea with sufficient clearness to show the importance of investigating the different religions in this respect.

* "God in History," by C. C. J. Baron Bunsen, vol. I. p. 29.

VIII.

RELIGION AND THE ARTS.

Mr. Ruskin* says, "The great arts have had and can have, but three principal directions of purpose:—first, that of enforcing the religion of men; secondly, that of perfecting their ethical state; thirdly, that of doing them material service." The second seems doubtful, though I quite agree with Mr. Ruskin that it ought to be so, and also that the highest degree of art is impossible without ethical strength in the artist; he must have fought the great battle in his heart and won the victory, perhaps after many defeats, yet there must be known to him and reign in him the *classic calmness*, peace of his mind, harmony of the emotions of his heart.

Religion is to Mr. Ruskin only a subjective "feeling of love, reverence or dread with which the human

* *Lectures on Art*, p. 37. Though disagreeing with Mr. Ruskin in some points I warmly recommend his voluminous writings as instructive, suggestive and entertaining.

mind is affected by its conceptions of spiritual being." But are those conceptions not religious too?

Morality he defines as "the law of rightness in human conduct." For, he continues, "there are many religions, but there is only one morality." Are there not perhaps more different moral conceptions in the world than religious? Of actual morality each individual has as well his own conception as of religion. The objective ideal of morality, however, must be one and the same with the ideal of religion. "The relation of Art to Religion," Mr. Ruskin tells us (p. 44), "is distinctly threefold: first, we have to ask how far art may have been literally directed by spiritual powers; secondly, how far, if not inspired, it may have been exalted by them; lastly, how far, in any of its agencies, it has advanced the cause of the creeds it has been used to recommend."

These questions can be answered satisfactorily only by comparative religion. Mr. Ruskin's attempts are too commonplace, may be of service in a schoolroom, but scarcely to an enquiring mind. He says (p. 45), "Every thing which men rightly accomplish is indeed done by Divine help, but under a consistent law which is never departed from." Who ever denied such a law? What is denied is that the law is mechanical and not personal or dynamic; we prefer to say it is *religious* and *moral* law. "All things are possible to well-directed labour," is, to say the least, a hyperbolic saying. Put all writers of our present time together and well direct their labour, you will not produce one Shakespeare, nor from all painters one Raphael, nor from the sculptors a Michael Angelo.

Mr. Ruskin says (p. 48), "The operation of formative art on religious creed is essentially twofold; the realization of their imagined spiritual persons and the limitation of their imagined presence to certain places." Mr. Ruskin uses the expression "religious creed" not "religious life;" our readers already know the vital difference of the two terms.

Mr. Ruskin continues (p. 49), "There are thus two distinct operations upon our mind: first, the art makes us believe what we would not otherwise have believed; and secondly, it makes us think of subjects we should not otherwise have thought of." Mr. Ruskin is altogether mistaken in these two points. Art never creates religion or religious belief, but is the expression of it and may help some individuals who have already a tendency towards it by their definite formation, or, we might say, formulation of a distinct belief or thought.

Rather strange is what Mr. Ruskin says (p. 51), "If the Greeks, instead of multiplying representations of what they imagined to be the figure of the god, had given us accurate drawings of the heroes and battles of Marathon and Salamis,* . . . they would have served their religion more truly than by all the vase-paintings and fine statues that ever were buried or adored." I beg permission to disagree on this point with the professor of fine arts. Statues or portraits of individuals can never become universal; we may

* Compare also Ruskin's *Lectures on Architecture and Painting*, IV., "Of all the wastes of time and sense which Modernism has invented—and they are many—none are so ridiculous as this endeavour to represent past history."

admire them as exhibiting mastery in technic art, but we want more. Alexander is only *one* king, Zeus is *the* king, etc. Superior art must be generic without becoming indefinite, the very characteristics of the class must be apparent in the most perfect way. We see the same thing before our own eyes. The statue of Schiller is not only a true portrait of his person but a representation of the idealistic Poet.

I must, however, not enter too much in the realm of arts, as that is not my province.

The close connection between arts and religion, especially in ancient times, is acknowledged not only by Mr. Ruskin but by almost all authorities. Not much, however, has been done yet to show the difference of the religions in that respect. Of the sacred poetry of different nations we have already fine collections to enable the student of comparative religion to investigate his subject and tell us what immediate purpose each poem had, whether it was in praise of some gods or of ancestors, or whether it had any other aim. We want then to know how this is accomplished,—are deeds related (epic) or are effusions given of the feelings of the poet's heart (lyrics)? It is further of interest to observe how the secular poetry branched off from the sacred stem, and what kind of relation existed between the two kinds? How much of the human sphere was considered sacred may be learned from the religious poetry of the period. We may besides gather many indications if not revelations of the intercourse between the divine and the human world.

Sacred lyrics open the innermost heart of man,

and we are allowed to see into the most secret recesses of the human soul, and become witnesses of its intercourse with the Unseen world, its delights in the enjoyment of it and its sorrows at any interruption with it. We feel with the poet his troubles caused by adversaries, his scorn at them and his hope that his God must triumph over all enemies.

It will be of great interest to learn how the religious sentiment differs in different religions, and how it expressed itself in poetic language, in peculiar metaphors, etc.—

Perhaps as old as poetry is architecture. We find everywhere the noblest edifices dedicated to the gods. The structure of such buildings is, however, different from all other buildings, why? What was the original meaning of such a peculiar form? In connection with the temples we observe peculiar ornaments to which a symbolical meaning is attached; those symbols and other ornaments are again different in different periods and among different nations, but must be shown always to correspond with the religious ideas.

In the temples and on the altars a certain variety of vessels were used made of different materials and all in a more or less artificial form, as lamps, incense burners, vases, cups, etc. Man seems everywhere to have striven to do his very best for his gods, and other objects of his worship.—

Music is also one of the earliest sacred arts. What kind of instruments were used, which in solo and which in concert with others? There is no possibility to compare the tunes of sacred music of ancient

religions, as the tones of music were not yet written down, though we find names for the different tones, yet their succession in a melody has not been so denoted to enable us to reproduce it. But we know the keys of the music of many nations and a little of the time or rhythm. We find it strange, however, that nothing has been done yet to collect the most characteristic pieces of sacred music of the different religions and nations of the present day. Many interesting inferences could be drawn from such a collection.

Music has been accompanied by song, but not always nor everywhere. Mimics and dances were also performed in connection with music. Then the drama followed in later periods. We see again secular music branch off and become developed in connection or oftener in opposition to sacred music. As we have at present Choral and Oratorio as sacred, People-song and Opera as secular music, so even the Chinese had something of the kind (*mutata mutandis*) long before the time of Confucius. What was the original idea of using music for sacred purposes and how did the various religions differ in their respective usages?—

Sculpture is another branch of the fine arts which became developed by religion. Designs were made of the gods, of their symbols, representations of their deeds, etc. How did men of different religions express their ideas of God in these sculptures? We see at one superficial glance that there is a great difference between the sculptures of Egypt, of Assyria, Greece, India, China, and other countries. We find in Greek sculptures the most ideal human figures but always expressive of one side of the human nature, as majesty in

Jupiter, sensuality in the Fauns, loveliness in Venus, self possession in Minerva, etc. If we knew nothing of the Greek belief in such gods we would take Greek sculpture for nothing but fine idealised statues of excellent human beings.* The gods were thought like man (anthropomorphism) and man like the gods (apotheosis). It is different with Assyrian sculptures, where everything pertaining to the gods is colossal to indicate their, the human world far surpassing, greatness. Worse even it is with the Indian plastic arts, as the divine attributes are expressed on the figure in a symbolic form. But it is not the place here to enter into details. We see sculpture is not only the product of mythology, there are other peculiarities of religious and of national abilities made apparent in those works of art. We have, however, to remember that no artist could create a god or even another form of a god, such would never have become recognised by any worshipper. The artist had to take the religious idea from the common belief of his time and give it an artistic form according to his abilities.

Painting, though later developed than the other arts, is known in remotest antiquity. The colours were distinguished and a symbolic meaning attached to them. It is again of interest to learn which colours were preferred by a special religion, and what combinations of colours. When we meet with pictures it is of interest to know what ideas there are expressed by them, and how this is done.

* Aristotle already said, "the gods that have human form are nothing but eternal men."

Mr. Ruskin* gives us again some very valuable hints which may serve as a pattern how to treat the different branches of the fine arts for the purpose of the science of religion. Mr. Ruskin says:

“You have then these two great divisions of human mind: one, content with the colours of things, whether they are dark or light; the other seeking light pure, as such, and dreading darkness as such. One, also, content with the coloured aspects and visionary shapes of things; the other seeking their form and substance. And, as I said, the school of knowledge, seeking light, perceives, and has to accept and deal with obscurity; and seeking form, it has to accept and deal with formlessness or death.

“Farther, the school of colour in Europe, using the word Gothic in its broadest sense, is essentially Gothic Christian; and full of comfort and peace. Again, the school of light is essentially Greek, and full of sorrow. I cannot tell you which is right, or least wrong. I tell you only what I know—this vital distinction between them: the Gothic or colour school is always cheerful, the Greek always oppressed by the shadow of death; and the stronger its masters are, the closer that body of death grips them. . . .

“But remember, its first development, and all its final power, depends on Greek sorrow, and Greek religion.

“The school of light is founded in the Doric worship of Apollo and the Ionic worship of Athena, as the spirits of life in the light, and of life in the air,

* Lectures on Art, p. 147, ff.

opposed each to their own contrary deity of death—Apollo to the Python, Athena to the Gorgon—Apollo as life in light, to the earth spirit of corruption in darkness, Athena as life by motion, to the Gorgon spirit of death by pause, freezing, or turning to stone; both of the great divinities taking their glory from the evil they have conquered; both of them, when angry, taking to men the form of the evil which is their opposite—Apollo slaying by poisoned arrow, by pestilence; Athena by cold, the black ægis on her breast. These are definite and direct expressions of the Greek thoughts respecting death and life. But underlying both these, and far more mysterious, dreadful, and yet beautiful, there is the Greek conception of spiritual darkness; of the anger of fate, whether foredoomed or avenging; the root and theme of all Greek tragedy; the anger of the Erinnyes, and Demeter Erinnys, compared to which the anger either of Apollo or Athena is temporary and partial;—and also, while Apollo or Athena only slay, the power of Demeter and the Eumenides is over the whole life; so that in the stories of Bellerophon, of Hippolytus, of Orestes, of Oedipus, you have an incomparably deeper shadow than any that was possible to the thought of later ages, when the hope of the Resurrection had become definite.”

I cannot enter here into a philosophy of aesthetics. Those who take interest in the subject can easily get a library of well-written books in reference to it. My object here is only to point out, as briefly as possible, the relation between the fine arts and religion. We have again to be on our guard not to mix up religion with fine arts or æsthetic feelings. The arts have

their origin in our sense of beauty and in imagination (phantasia). Art may separate itself from religion, and has done so. Men of high artistic genius and culture have been most unreligious persons. John Ruskin says (p. 11) "I need scarcely refer, except for the sake of completeness in my statement, to one form of demand for art which is wholly unenlightened, and powerful only for evil; namely, the demand of the classes occupied solely in the pursuit of pleasure, for objects and modes of art that can amuse indolence or satisfy sensibility. There is no need for any discussion of these requirements or of their form of influence, though they are very deadly at present in their operation on sculpture, and on jewellers' work. They cannot be checked by blame, nor guided by instruction; they are merely the necessary results of whatever defects exist in the temper and principles of a luxurious society; and it is only by moral changes, not by art-criticism that their action can be modified."

Art in its highest perfection is nature, but nature idealized, glorified. Nature as it is, shows not beauty in an unmixed form, but contains everywhere features of ugliness, of disfiguring death and corruption; the finest forms and views are, besides, transitory, momentary and therefore, illusory. Art makes those moments permanent. In religious service (Cultus) the arts, as nature in its ideal form, are made subservient to the worship of God. In such use we find, if nowhere else, a clear distinction of sacred arts from the profane. Not every kind of architecture is thought fit for places of worship, not every kind of sculpture, music and painting is allowed to enter the sacred halls. It

may be difficult to find out why this kind of art was considered sacred and the other profane, yet the fact remains, and careful investigation may perhaps succeed in discovering some of the characteristics of them. By genuine religious art, I think, commonly is understood what is properly called *sublime*. Another of Mr. Ruskin's fine sayings (p. 62) is also to the point, "In Reverence is the chief joy and power of life—Reverence, for what is pure and bright in your own youth, for what is true and tried in the age of others; for all that is gracious among the living, great among the dead, and marvellous in the Power that cannot die." Any art that creates such Reverence is religious or sacred art; though, to guard against misunderstanding, sacred in this sense is far from being sacred or holy in the specific Christian sense. We find again that the meaning of many forms of worship, of symbols, etc. has been lost, and things are performed as *opus operatum*. There is one of the great dangers to which religion is brought by the fine arts. Another danger is, that the real object of worship is lost sight of, and the performances of arts absorb all the attention, a reverie of feelings is mistaken for devotional spirit. In such periods the arts will also exert a debasing influence on morality. Mr. Ruskin says very well, p. 26: "The art, or general productive and formative energy, of any country, is an exact exponent of its ethical life. You can have noble art only from noble persons, associated under laws fitted to their time and circumstances . . . Men's best arts and brightest happiness are consistent, and consistent only, with their virtue."

When the mind is not carried up by the enjoyment of beauty in the fine arts to the eternal regions of beauty in the ideal and Divine world, it will sink down deeper in sensual enjoyments. The fine arts form the golden link between the Spiritual and the sensual beauty. We can find sensualistic arts, with or without a religious fig-leaf put on, among almost all nations. As soon as religion becomes conscious of itself again, it turns with disgust from such arts to rigoristic morals.

Mr. Ruskin says emphatically and truly, p. 60: "Must it not then be only because we love our own work better than His, that we respect the lucent glass, but not the lucent clouds, that we weave embroidered robes with ingenious fingers, and make bright the gilded vaults we have beautifully ordained—while yet we have not considered the heavens the work of His fingers, nor the stars of the strange vault which He has ordained. And do we dream that by carving fonts and lifting pillars in His honour, who cuts the way of the rivers among the rocks, and at whose reproof the pillars of the earth are astonished, we shall obtain pardon for the dishonour done to the hills and streams by which He has appointed our dwelling place . . . as if we laboured only that we might be able to give the lie to the song "Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of all creatures, Heaven and Earth are full of Thy glory?"

We may grant so much and go one step farther rejecting all fine arts as detrimental to true religious life, yet even the severest Puritanism cannot altogether free itself from some arts in the worship of God.

There is singing done which implies poetry and music. There is some mimic at praying by kneeling and folding or stretching out the hands. There are symbols used, if not in sculptures and paintings yet in actions, as baptism and the Lord's supper; and extensive use is made of allegories and figures in speech. We see Comparative Religion has a wide field of investigation in the regions of the beautiful. *Winkelman*, the renowned explainer of Greek art, says, "Beauty is one of the great mysteries of nature, we all see and perceive its effects, but a general and clear notion of it belongs to those tenets of truth which have not yet been found out." As "Highest beauty" is in God, and in every pure and perfect work of God, the missing notion is certainly not far from religion.

IX.

RELIGION AND NATURE.

As there is already a chapter on Religion and Science it will be understood at once that no theory on nature is meant here, but simply the world around man, even including human life in its everyday appearance.

“There are more ways than one of studying natural history.* There is Dr. Dryasdust’s way, which consists of mere accuracy of definition and differentiation; statistics as harsh, and dry as the skins and bones in the museum where it is studied. There is the field-observer’s way; the careful and conscientious accumulation and record of facts bearing on the life-history of the creatures; statistics as fresh and bright as the forest or meadow where they are gathered in the dewy morning. And there is the poet’s way; who looks at nature through a glass peculiarly his own; the

* *The Romance of Natural History*, by Philip Henry Gosse. Preface.

aesthetic aspect, which deals, not with statistics, but with the emotions of the human mind,—surprise, wonder, terror, revulsion, admiration, love, desire, and so forth—which are made energetic by the contemplation of the creatures around him.

“In my many years’ wanderings through the wide field of natural history, I have always felt towards it something of a poet’s heart, though destitute of a poet’s genius. As Wordsworth so beautifully says,—

‘To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.’ ”

One method of studying nature Mr. Gosse has, however, left unmentioned, that is the religious method. Though somewhat resembling the poetical treatment it will become soon apparent that the differences are even greater than the resemblances. Though as in poetical sentiments the feelings depend on association and contrast, yet the religious view brings the appearance of natural life in contact with some *eternal truth*. Every religion shows, however, some peculiarity in this respect.

As individual men are differently disposed towards nature and natural life, one enjoying everything in kind and generous sympathy, another taking scarcely any notice of these same things; one seeing beauty everywhere, another only decay; one feeling the pulsations of life, another the approachings of death, etc.—so the different religions.

But not only the general view of natural life which different religions take, is of interest to us, but perhaps more so the many details connected with religious

teachings and religious life. Some devoted persons may leave human society and live among wild beasts, others allow men to die from hunger and nurse animals. Confucius liked to stand still at a river and look into the constant flowing of its water with exaltation of his mind. "The wise ones love the water, the humane ones love mountains," is an old Chinese saying. Every religion and every nation has some peculiarity in that respect. Certain trees were thought sacred to some divinities. Pliny mentions that in Greece the oak-tree was sacred to Jupiter, the olive-tree to Minerva, the myrtle to Venus, the laurel to Apollo, the poplar to Hercules. In India the *Banian* tree or Indian fig is regarded as sacred. In China the Cypress, Pine and other trees as well, the lotus flower in India and from there by the Buddhists of other countries. The altars on the fields have commonly a sacred tree to overshadow them, near temples and monasteries trees are cultivated, on or near the graves trees and flowers are planted. Each religion and perhaps each country differs in its predilection. So it is even with animals. Some are regarded as sacred, others as unclean. Many natural objects are used as symbols or emblems. Others of rare occurrence are regarded as ominous, as in China the phoenix (pheasant?), the appearance of a comet, etc. The life of every individual is written in the stars, not only birth and death, but his success in trade or literature, in marriage and descendants.

Many beautiful sentences can be gathered from the illustrations taken from nature given in the teachings of different religions. I shall here only point to

the Bible. The Old Testament is full of it. Even our Lord Jesus speaks commonly in parables, and takes nature, as it appears to every man, as the language of God, full of meaning and eternal truth. He refers to lightning in various senses, to the colour of heaven, the gathering clouds, to wind, rain and floods, to the sand or rock as foundation for buildings, to the depth of the sea, to fire and salt; he refers to plants and their life, mint and other spices, the reed on the banks of Jordan, the lilies growing in the desert, to the grapes on the vine, the fig-tree, the grain and its development; to different animals as to little gnats and large camels, sparrows and eagles, fish and birds, snakes and doves, wolves and sheep, foxes having dens, a hen gathering her chickens under her wings, etc.

The everyday life of human society is referred to even more frequently: the leaven which a woman took, her lost piece of silver, fishermen casting their nets, husbandmen sowing their seed, old and new vessels for wine, cloth for repairing clothes, bread for children and feeding dogs, children playing in the market, asking their parents for food, a miser (Luke 12, 16, ff.), and his rich harvest, an unjust judge, a wedding feast and going to meet the bride, the relation of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. He speaks too of the pleasures of the rich and the misery of the poor, of hiring workmen and paying their wages, of nobles and servants, palaces and prisons, etc. How striking is Christ's fondness of little children, his placing one child as a pattern before his disciples, his pure friendship even with females (Martha and Mary), his tender love to his mother even on the cross; how superior is

his usage of common events, as the woman's drawing water, the widow at the treasury, Siloah's tower, Pilate's murder of the Galileans, John's living and preaching, etc. Christ also points to historical facts well known to all his hearers, as the creation, the first man, the first bloodshed of Abel, Noah and the flood, Abraham, Sodom, Israel in the desert, at mount Sinai, King David, Elijah, Jonas, etc. We could go on and gather many more references to nature from the writings of the apostles. But completeness is not my purpose at present. So much is clear that the religion of our Bible has the most intimate and noble relation to nature and history. But a mind without peace cannot enjoy nature, and a mind without hope cannot understand history. This is the reason that many so-called Christians failed in recognizing the above indicated Gospel-truths and went astray in monkish and eremitical negation of nature, though even this seldom has gone so far as to be dead against the beauty of fine landscape, but only against nature relating to men.

It is greatly to be regretted that the religious preaching, teaching and writing of our age is commonly either dogmatical, abstract moral or fictitious. Especially the latter kind is now a great danger to religion and to the health of social and individual morality. A quotation from an author* who deserves to be not forgotten may give a few suggestions. "To affirm, that it is necessary for the entertainment of the human mind to have recourse to fictitious scenes and

* Thomas Dick, LL.D. *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 155, ff. Hartford, 1846.

narratives, and to the wild vagaries of an unbridled imagination, is, in effect, to throw a reflection upon the plans and the conduct of the Creator. It implies, that, in the scenes of nature which surround us, both in the heavens and on the earth, and in the administrations of his moral government among men, God has not produced a sufficient variety of interesting objects for the contemplation, the instruction and the entertainment of the human race—and that the system of the moral and physical world must be distorted and deranged, and its economy misrepresented and blended with the creations of human folly, before its scenery be rendered fit to gratify the depraved and fastidious tastes of mankind. And is it indeed true, that there is not a sufficient variety to gratify a rational mind in the existing scenes of creation and providence? If we survey the Alpine scenes of nature; if we explore the wonders of the ocean; if we penetrate into the subterraneous recesses of the globe; if we direct our view to the numerous objects of sublimity and of beauty to be found in every country; if we investigate the structure and economy of the animal and the vegetable tribes; if we raise our eyes to the rolling orbs of heaven; if we look back to the generations of old, and trace the history of ancient nations; if we contemplate the present state of civilized and of savage tribes, and the moral scenery which is everywhere displayed around us—shall we not find a sufficient variety of everything which is calculated to interest, to instruct, and to entertain a rational mind? I am bold to affirm that were a proper selection made of the facts connected with the system of nature, and with the history and

the present state of human society, and were the sketches of such facts executed by the hand of a master, and interspersed with rational and moral reflections—volumes might be presented to the public, no less entertaining and certainly far more instructive, than all the novels and romances which the human imagination has ever produced ; and that, too, without distorting a single fact in the system of nature or of human society.

“ If man were only the creature of a day, whose whole existence was confined within the limits of this sublunary scene, he might amuse himself either with facts or with fictions, or with any toys or gewgaws that happened to strike his fancy while he glided down the stream of time to the gulf of oblivion. But if he is a being destined for eternity, the train of his thoughts ought to be directed to objects corresponding to his high destination, and all his amusements blended with those moral instructions which have an ultimate reference to the scene of his immortal existence. When I read one of our modern novels, I enjoy for a few hours, a transitory amusement in contemplating the scenes of fancy it displays, and in following the hero through his numerous adventures ; I admire the force and brilliancy of the imagination of the writer (for I am by no means disposed to underrate the intellectual talent which has produced some of the works to which I allude), but when I have finished the perusal, and reflect, that all the scenes which passed before my mental eye, were only so many unsubstantial images, the fictions of a lively imagination—I cannot indulge in rational or religious reflections on the subject, nor

derive a single moral instruction, any more than I can do from a dream or a vision of the night. When I survey the scenes of creation; when I read the history of ancient nations; when I peruse the authentic narratives of the voyager and traveller; when I search the records of revelation; and when I contemplate the present state of society around me,—I learn something of the character, the attributes, and the providence of God, and of the moral and physical state of mankind. From almost every scene, and every incident, I can deduce instructions calculated to promote the exercise of humility, meekness, gratitude, and resignation—to lead the mind to God as the source of felicity, and as the righteous governor of the world—and to impress the heart with a sense of the folly and depravity of man. But it is obvious, that no distinct moral instructions can be fairly deduced from scenes, circumstances, and events ‘which never did nor can take place.’ Such however is, at present, the tide of public opinion on this subject, that we might as soon attempt to stem a mountain torrent by a breath of wind, or to interrupt the dashings of a mighty cataract by the waving of our hand, as to expect to counteract, by any considerations that can be adduced, the current of popular feeling in favour of novels, and tales of knights and of tournaments, of warlike chieftains and military encounters. Such a state of feeling, I presume, never can exist in a world where moral evil has never shed its malign influence.”

It is always a symptom of decay when the mind turns away from nature and seeks gratification in mere fiction. It will be understood that I only mean works

which, though productions of the imagination, are not art, but artificial or opposed to nature. Such productions spoil the taste alike for nature and for genuine art. Not only our modern time suffers from the disease described by Mr. Dick, all nations have had such periods. The Rabbinical writings, for example, are full of it. Religion is, at first, a check to the growth of fiction, but may give way to it sooner or later. The classical periods are commonly free from it. In China the Confucian writers keep clear for a long period, but fiction has crept in during the Han dynasty. The Taoist writers are much sooner spoiled, as the work of Licius already clearly shows, and the next writer, Chancius (Chang Tsz) goes already a step further. From these few indications the importance of a treatment of the different religions with respect to nature and fiction is manifest enough to make further remarks here unnecessary. A few lines in another direction must however not be omitted.

Nature cannot give true peace to our soul; we have to find this in religion. If our mind is gratified with the enjoyment of eternal blessings we are prepared to see and cherish all the glimpses of this same Divine goodness and glory in the creation surrounding us. Such joy is superior to any other joy dependent on human contrivance. What the vulgar voice calls pleasure is in many instances a painful sight to a religious mind. True enjoyment of nature is far, however, from sentimentality. As food taken regularly and properly will not weaken but strengthen the body, so will the innocent intercourse of the mind with nature and history invigorate us to perform our duties with more cheer-

fulness and mental health. Mr. Ruskin* says well, "This infinite universe is unfathomable, inconceivable, in its whole; every human creature must slowly spell out, and long contemplate such part of it as may be possible for him to reach; then set forth what he has learned of it for those beneath him; extricating it from infinity as one gathers a violet out of grass; one does not improve either violet or grass in gathering it, but one makes the flower visible; and then the human being has to make its power upon his own heart visible also, and to give it the honour of the good thoughts it has raised up in him, and to write upon it the history of his own soul. And sometimes he may be able to do more than this, and to set it in strange lights, and display it in a thousand ways before unknown: ways specially directed to necessary and noble purposes, for which he had to choose instruments out of the wide armoury of God. All this he may do: and in this he is only doing what every Christian has to do with the written as well as the created word, 'rightly dividing the word of truth.' Out of the infinity of the written word he has also to gather and set forth things new and old, to choose them for the season and the work that are before him, to explain and manifest them to others, with such illustration and enforcement as may be in his power, and to crown them with the history of what, by them, God has done for his soul."

* The Stones of Venice, see Selections from the writings of John Ruskin, p. 315.

X.

RELIGION AND LANGUAGE.

Max Müller takes it for granted that all words found to be the common property of different branches of one language belong to the primitive language before the separation of these branches: This is certainly true of most of the words in question, yet gentle doubts may be allowed with regard to some words at least. We have not sufficient knowledge of the intercourse of the primitive tribes and nations to enable us to deny a migration of roots or of words which were accommodated to the peculiarities of the different languages by other pronunciation, writing and then changed ending, perhaps even by a modified initial syllable etc. Other words, though they belong to the primeval period, have not yet had the peculiar meaning latter times attached to them. This is the case even with the ancient word for Heaven. Max Müller says (p. 206) "Everywhere they begin with the meaning of *sky*, they rise to the meaning of God and they sink down

again to the meaning of gods and spirits." Has not such been the case everywhere, *i.e.* not only among the Turanians but among all nations? and if so, what does it prove? I suppose in many instances nothing but some common psychological laws, but not yet a closer relation of different nations and tribes. It does even not yet follow that, because those tribes named God *heaven* or sky, they thought heaven or the sky to be God, (see Fairbairn, p. 32). Max Müller is cautious enough not to conclude from the occurrence of the most widely-spread form of natural religion that all those tribes in Africa, on the Islands in different Oceans, in Asia and in America, have got their notion from their ancestors before they became separated, and that what they have in common now is the very feature of most primitive religion. Such has indeed been done by Herbert Spencer, who considers as the rudimentary form of all religion the propitiation of dead ancestors who are supposed to be still existing and to be capable of working good or ill to their descendants.* Mr. Fairbairn (p. 23) says well "Resemblances that may be classed as coincidences evolved in the course of subsequent development, must, of course be excluded. Under this head many of the points comparative mythology seizes, may be comprehended. The same faculties in men of the same race, working under different conditions indeed, but with kindred materials, could hardly fail to produce similar results."

* See *Principles of Sociology* (quot. by F. p. 9). The same view is taken by *W. H. F. Bleek*, the distinguished investigator of the South African languages. See *F. Goldzieher, Mythology among the Hebrews*, p. 3.

To return again to language I must confess finding a most striking mistake of Max Müller in his confusion of language and religion. He says, p. 153, "A few words recognised as names of the deity, a few epithets lastly some more or less technical terms, expressive of such ideas—sacrifice, altar, prayer, possibly virtue and sin, body and spirit—this is what constitutes the outward framework of the incipient religions of antiquity. If we look at this simple manifestation of religion we see at once why religion, during those early ages of which we are here speaking, may really and truly be called a sacred dialect of human speech; how at all events early religion and early language are most intimately connected, religion depending entirely for its outward expression on the more or less adequate resources of the language."

We may ask Max Müller what was first, religion or the word for it, religious life or adequate language to express it, altars and sacrifices, etc. or names for them? If, however, all those religious realities are first, how can they depend on language, *i.e.* on the words used to designate them? Religious life is as much or as little dependent on language as natural life. We do not eat and drink such kind of food because we use such words, but we use such words because we use the things. In primitive religion things were not worshipped because they had, by mistake of one or the other kind, received the name of gods, but they were named gods because people considered them for one or the other reason fit objects for worship. It is the same with all other designations in language. A horse is not used for races because some persons call it so, but it is

so called because it is considered fit for races. Nor does the word "elephant" make elephants or influence these animals in the least, nor do we say, if it can be proved where and when the word first occurs, that then elephants first came into existence. The term "law of gravitation" does not form this law, nor has it introduced it into nature, for it existed even before language and before man existed. Thus it is even with things pertaining to human nature, and accomplishments. Man did speak a language perhaps for centuries before he got a word "*language*," probably the word for "tongue" served for this purpose in many languages. So for *mind*, etc. It is a fact that in the Hebrew of the Old Testament there is no word for *conscience*. Does this prove that the Hebrews had none? Not in the least. We know they had, but expressed it by the general term for "heart." Max Müller is wrong in his statements, and the cause thereof is a confusion of realities with human knowledge about them. Language is nothing but the result and depository of man's knowledge. Man names what things he knows and how far he knows them. The more adequate our knowledge of things becomes the more adequate our language will grow. On the other hand, however, we must not overlook the fact that *language is the currency** for our

* "Words are wise men's counters; they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools." *Hobbes*.

"In a sense, it is not the individual, but the community, that makes and changes language. . . . The community's share in the work is dependent on and conditioned by the simple fact that language is not an individual possession, but a social. It exists not only partly, but primarily, for the purpose of communication; its other uses come after and in the train of this." W. D. Whitney, *The Life and Growth of Language*, p. 149.

mental intercourse, by it the *usage* of words, etc. is conditioned, and not by etymology, which shows the first formation. With the language we learn all the mental accomplishments of a people, get the results of the mental activity of all ages before us. *Our intellect* is dependent on language for its *development*; this is not the case so much with our feelings and our will, though some kind of influence of one faculty upon the other faculties is beyond doubt, as human nature forms an organic whole.

Max Müller goes even farther (p. 268.) "There are two distinct tendencies to be observed in the growth of ancient language. There is on the one side, the struggle of mind against the material character of language, a constant attempt to strip words of their coarse covering and fit them, by main force, for the purposes of abstract thought. But there is on the other side, a constant relapse from the spiritual into the material, and, strange to say, a predilection for the material sense instead of the spiritual" (explained by the use of language as currency above referred to). "This action and reaction has been going on in the language of religion from the earliest times, and it is at work even now. It seems at first a fatal element in religion that it cannot escape from this flux and reflux of human thought" (oftener perhaps thoughtlessness!) "which is repeated at least once in every generation, between father and son, between mother and daughter; but if we watch it more closely, we shall find, I think, that this flux and reflux constitutes the very life of religion."

Talk and mere words—the very life of religion!

how strange that a man like Max Müller can entertain such a view. Language only gives us the reflection of our life in a mirror, not the life itself, it gives the intellectualised life, although imagination also asserts a great influence over language.* We shall see hereafter that what Max Müller really means is conflict of reflection and imagination and their influence on religion, but it is certainly an unpardonable error to ascribe such power to mere language; how could words do such miracles? Many readers will, doubtlessly, be interested to find my views on the bearing of language upon religion corroborated by no less an authority than H. Maine who, though not a philologist, is one of the best judges of the peculiarities of antiquity. "It is conceded on all sides," he says,† "that the earliest language of the Christian Church was Greek, and that the problems to which it first addressed itself were those for which Greek philosophy in its later forms had prepared the way. Greek metaphysical literature contained the sole stock of

* "The same Divine Mind (Vernunft) that rules in nature and in human thinking, giving them their laws, also reigns in language, and it is the imagination which in language realizes the thoughts and idealizes the things. The Divine and the human penetrate each other. Man has in his mind (faculty of thinking) the logical law, and goes on reasonably—though not scientific—reasonably—in the development of language. His spirit (soul) makes its nature to its deed. The idea of language is God's thought and it forms the foundation of every language; but the realization in peculiar languages is man's own deed. Our thinking lays hold of the nature of things and pronounces it in words, because all things are originally thought in the Divine Spirit, are founded in the Eternal Word and are thus created. To him who looks deeper God is incarnate everywhere." M. Carrière, *Die Kunst im Zusammenhang der Culturentwicklung und die Ideale der Menschheit*, Vol. I., p. 16, 21.

† *Ancient Law*, p. 344, ff.

words and ideas out of which the human mind could provide itself with the means of engaging in the profound controversies as to the Divine Persons, the Divine Substance, and the Divine Natures. The Latin language and the meagre Latin philosophy were quite unequal to the undertaking, and accordingly the Western or Latin-speaking provinces of the Empire adopted the conclusions of the East without disputing or reviewing them. 'Latin Christianity,' says Dean Milman, 'accepted the creed which its narrow and barren vocabulary could hardly express in adequate terms. Yet, throughout, the adhesion of Rome and the West was a passive acquiescence in the dogmatic system which had been wrought out by the profounder theology of the Eastern divines, rather than a vigorous and original examination on her part of those mysteries. The Latin Church was the scholar as well as the loyal partizan of Athanasius.' But when the separation of East and West became wider, and the Latin-speaking Western Empire began to live with an intellectual life of its own, its defence to the East was all at once exchanged for the agitation of a number of questions entirely foreign to Eastern speculation. 'While Greek theology (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, Preface, 5) went on defining with still more exquisite subtlety the Godhead and the nature of Christ, while the interminable controversy still lengthened out and cast forth sect after sect from the enfeebled community'—the Western Church threw itself with passionate ardour into a new order of disputes, the same which from those days to this have never lost their interest for any family of mankind at any time

included in the Latin communion. The nature of Sin and its transmission by inheritance, the debt owed by man and its vicarious satisfaction, the necessity and sufficiency of the Atonement, above all the apparent antagonism between Free-will and the Divine Providence, these were points which the West began to debate as ardently as ever the East had discussed the articles of its more special creed. Why is it then that on the two sides of the line which divides the Greek-speaking from the Latin-speaking provinces there lie two classes of theological problems so strikingly different from one another? The historians of the Church have come close upon the solution when they remark that the new problems were more 'practical,' less absolutely speculative, than those which had torn Eastern Christianity asunder, but none of them, so far as I am aware, has quite reached it. I affirm without hesitation that the difference between the two theological systems is accounted for by the fact that, in passing from the West, theological speculation had passed from a climate of *Greek metaphysics* to a climate of *Roman law*. For some centuries before these controversies rose into overwhelming importance, all the intellectual activity of the Western Romans had been expended on jurisprudence exclusively. They had been occupied in applying a peculiar set of principles to all combinations in which the circumstances of life are capable of being arranged. No foreign pursuit or taste called off their attention from this engrossing occupation, and for carrying it on they possessed a vocabulary as accurate as it was copious, a strict method of reasoning, a stock of general propositions

on conduct more or less verified by experience, and a rigid moral philosophy. It was impossible that they should not select from the questions indicated by the Christian records those which had some affinity with the order of speculations to which they were accustomed, and that their manner of dealing with them should borrow something from their forensic habits. Almost everybody who has knowledge enough of Roman law to appreciate the Roman penal system, the Roman theory of the obligations established by Contract or Delict, the Roman view of Debts and of the modes of incurring, extinguishing, and transmitting them, the Roman notion of the continuance of individual existence by Universal Succession, may be trusted to say whence arose the frame of mind to which the problems of Western theology proved so congenial, whence came the phraseology in which these problems were stated, and whence the description of reasoning employed in their solution. It must only be recollected that the Roman law which had worked itself into Western thought was neither the archaic system of the ancient city, nor the pruned and curtailed jurisprudence of the Byzantine Emperors; still less, of course, was it the mass of rules, nearly buried in a parasitical overgrowth of modern speculative doctrine, which passes by the name of Modern Civil Law. I only speak of that philosophy of jurisprudence, wrought out by the great juridical thinkers of the Antonine age, which may still be partially reproduced from the Pandects of Justinian, a system to which few faults can be attributed except perhaps that it aimed at a higher degree of elegance, certainty, and precision than human

affairs will permit to the limits within which human laws seek to confine them."

We see that which Max Müller calls the power of language, H. Maine correctly ascribes to the mind. Eastern thought and education and Western thought and education, Metaphysics and jurisprudence had a great influence on religious thought in the respective countries. We find a repetition of the same thing as often as a religion spreads over another country. The language has to be conquered by the invading religion, *i.e.* the mind must be filled with the new thoughts and find adequate expression in a modified use of the existing language of the people.* Not the language of Canaan makes children of God, but godly sentiments create a godly language. I hope neither Max Müller nor any other scholar can entertain any doubts in regard to the soundness of the views given above.

* "There is always and everywhere an antecedency of the conception to the expression. In common phrase, we first have our idea, and then get a name for it. . . . The doctrine that a conception is impossible without a word to express it is an indefensible paradox—indefensible, that is to say, except by misapprehensions and false arguments." Whitney, *The Life and Growth of Language*, p. 137, 139.

XI.

RELIGION AND MYTHOLOGY.

Max Müller says (p. 353) "Mythology is inevitable, it is natural, it is an inherent necessity of language, if we recognise in language the outward form and manifestation of thought; it is in fact the dark shadow which language throws on thought, and which can never disappear till language becomes altogether commensurate with thought, which it never will. Mythology (p. 355) in the highest sense, is the power exercised by language on thought in every possible sphere of mental activity."

This is again one of the hyperbolic effusions of Max Müller; language cannot do such great things, but imagination can and thoughtlessness can, for the latter is perhaps a greater power than thought, in some instances at least. I can see nothing in mythology but the predominating influence of *imagination* or, we may say, of *natural poetry* over religion. We see the same tendencies even in our time; people prefer their own

fancies and sentimental feelings to genuine religious truth. Max Müller's explanation of polytheism is consequently shallow and misleading. Though, what he says on the polyonymy of language is true, his assertion that this is what we are accustomed to call *polytheism* in religion is decidedly wrong. We are accustomed to call polytheism *idolatry*, i.e. a *worship* of false gods; worship however is *human action*, not mere "inevitable words" or "language." Mythology is thus inevitable in religion as weeds are inevitable in the fields, but if you allow them to grow, the fruit-plants will become suffocated. Epizoons are inevitable too, if cleanliness is neglected. But the language in its dialectic growth and decay is not the cause of idolatry. We may speak of the head, the face, the mouth, the lips, the breath, the word, the arms, etc. of God; such is language of childhood, a *parler enfantin* of religion. But to make the head, the face, etc. other gods and then gradually forget the one and true God; such is not the fault of language, but of human imagination and religious darkness. Mr Fairbairn* says: "The Indo European mythologies are simply the interpretation of nature by the imagination, acting spontaneously. They became unintelligible to a later age, because the later lost the mind of the earlier. The notion that they must have been concealed science, or disguised philosophy or distorted traditions, or misunderstood history, was the result of a reflective trying to interpret through itself a spontaneous age and faith. The mythologies had arisen without purpose or design, even, it

* *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History*, p. 365.

might be said, without thought. They were creations of the imagination clothed in forms supplied by the senses and the memory. To it heaven and earth were alive; the words that denoted natural denoted living objects. There was no death. The dread thing so named was by its very name realised and vivified. The universe pulsed with multitudinous life; what was in man was in nature—in nature, therefore, in him. The forest was musical with living voices, the midnight heaven alive with listening stars, the pale faced moon full of wierd influences, and the glorious sun as it broke from the bosom of the dawn a glad presence scattering the darkness that terrified. And when these fancies were thrown into speech the speech formed a mythology, a veracious reflection of mind in a period of beautiful yet creative simplicity, a dark enigma to mind perplexed with a thousand problems, seeking in the ancient beliefs a wisdom higher than its own.”

Mr. Fairbairn is quite correct in this excellent passage as far as Mythology is “nascent literature, spontaneous poetry.” But he himself, Max Müller and all other writers do not take Mythology *only* in the sense of poetry but of religion, and even Mr. Fairbairn’s explanation is thus insufficient and misleading. We might call the sky Jupiter and believe in a personality of every power of nature, in mountains, rivers, etc. The Christian religion even believes in innumerable hosts of Angels, of principalities and powers, speaks of a prince of this world and of many spirits as adherents to him; we may *speak* in poetry and prose of saints, heroes, ancestors, etc., yet there

is no danger of polytheism therein. As soon, however, as a personal relation between us and them is sought, when means are used to propitiate their favour, then worship begins, idolatry, *i.e.* polytheism commences. It is true that there are some religious ideas expressed in all kinds of mythology, just as the same physiological laws and ideas can be discovered in a diseased body as in a healthy, sometimes perhaps better in an advanced state of sickness. Certain conditions allowed, everything else is a matter of course; tumors and elephantiasis grow quite naturally, but are they natural in themselves? Delirium appears more natural than poetry, idiocy more than deep philosophy, death than life, and pain or pleasure are the same to natural laws. We find a far better solution of the problem of mythology in what Mr. Fairbairn says on the religion of the Aryans, p. 38, "To Indo-European man Heaven and God were one, not a thing, but a person, whose *Thou* stood over against his *I* (man). His life (man's) was one, the life above him was one too. Then, that life was generative, productive, the source of every other life, and so to express his full conception, he called the living Heaven, Diespiter, Dyauspitar,—Heaven—Father, (p. 42,) Dyaus' character, though shadowy and fragmentary, reveals moral elements transcending the conception of a mere physical deity. In the next period of religion, behind the Vedas and Avesta, we see the point where mind becomes conscious of a dualism in its faith, and by exclusion of the moral element, the Naturalism of the first (Vedas) is developed, by exclusion of the physical, the Spiritualism of the second (Avesta). But behind

this point stands the ancient and common Indo-European faith, in which the two elements existed together as matter and form, spirit and letter, not in a consciously apprehended dualism, but in a realised unity—(p. 44). But though the conceptions (creation of Varuna and Mitra after Dyaus)* graduate to Naturalism, they are not yet purely natural-creations indeed of the *imagination* but of it as still influenced by the *moral faculty*. But the conscience also acted indirectly on what we may term, after Schelling, the theogonic process. In prompting to worship, it furnished objects that could be personalized. The earliest worship was indeed, simple, but its tendency was to multiply acts and ceremonies. The first priests were the fathers of the family, but as life became more toilsome and occupied, the father was fain to delegate his priestly office to another. The sense of faults and sins too began to affect the worshipper, to force him to distinguish between secular and sacred, until he came to think that the man acceptable to God must be a man divorced from secular and devoted to sacred things. With a professional priesthood forms of worship increased, the ritual form became the matter of religion. What could reveal deity was deified. What made the worshipper accepted, forgiven, was idealized into the acceptor, the forgiver. And hence sacerdotal deities were evolved alongside the natural.” (Soma, juice of the plant).

* Chr. Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, 2nd Edit. Vol. I., p. 891, ff., gives the principal features of the history of Indian religion with more details but less philosophic clearness than Mr. Fairbairn, though Mr. Lassen gives us an excellent digest of all materials at this disposal.

P. 47, "The theogonic process thus operates at the beginning in two distinct spheres, the natural and the sacerdotal. Its action is influenced in the one by geographical conditions, in the other by social and political. The mythical faculty pursued in each sphere a different course, descended in the one, ascended in the other. But now, while this double theogonic process goes on, exhausting the natural and sacerdotal objects it has to deify, the necessary evolution of the human mind leads to another theogonic process, also double and starting from two opposite sides. This process, as it affects the gods, is anthropomorphism, as it affects man, apotheosis. The first by ascribing human forms and relations to the gods, prepares the way for the second, the deification of man. The one springs from the worship, the other from the unconscious poetry of a people. After the death of the mythical faculty the creation of new gods ended, but then combination begins. The gods of different tribes and nations become blended together."

We see Mr. F.'s description of the mythological or theogonic process materially differs from Max Müller's. Nothing is said of language, but imagination and even moral sense and conscience are given as factors, and as I think in truth. We have already reason and imagination pointed out as sources of error in religion. Conscience is not less dangerous, as it lays, with its binding obligations, unbearable burdens on the soul. All ritualism and empty formalism has its root in a morbid conscience. Here we see again how important it is to get the *whole human nature* rectified. Mr. Fairbairn does not indicate, that the well-described theo-

gonic process is not one of the healthy, but of the disordered organism of the human mind. Mythology is religion defiled by unsanctified imagination and morbid conscience, whereas reason makes itself conspicuous, in the creation of mythology, only by its absence, is active however, in later periods, in combination and explanation, and finally, if reason continues in office, it is utterly demolishing the mythological fancies. I cannot enter here in a discussion on the merits of the modern writers on mythology. Suffice it to give a quotation from an elaborate work:* “Both in Germany and England this school has notable adversaries . . . some worthy partisans of the study of classical literature refuse to receive the results of the science of Comparative Mythology. One of these is K. Lehrs; another is the latest German editor of Hesiod, who objects to the modern science of Mythology, that it ignores historical and philological criticism and seizes upon every passage of an author that suits its theory, without regard to its value and genuineness. Among the English scholars it is no less a writer than Fergusson who declares, ‘So far as I am capable of understanding it, it appears to me, that the ancient Solar Mythology of Messrs Max Müller and Cox is very like mere modern moonshine.’ And Mr. George Smith, the renowned pioneer of the ancient Assyrian literature, seems not to have much confidence in the latest method of mythological investigation; for he says in his latest book, ‘The early poems and stories of almost every nation are by some writers resolved into elaborate descriptions

* F. Goldziher, *Mythology among the Hebrews*; London, 1877.

of natural phenomena ; and in some cases, if that were true, the myth would have taken to create it a genius as great as that of the philosophers who explain it." There is, of course, some analogy between all that's living under the sun with the apparent life of the sun. The science of religion has to do yet much work in explaining the mythologies of the different religions, and the scientific treatment of Chinese religion will become a valuable help towards the solution of various questions in connexion therewith.

XII.

CLASSIFICATION OF RELIGIONS.

Max Müller says much on the principles of the classification of religion, and we have to agree with his polemic against *canonical* and *uncanonical*, *revealed* and *natural*, *national* and *individual*, *polytheistic*, *dualistic* and *monotheistic*, religions. But to take language as the principle of classification does not improve the matter. It may be of some help to classify the so-called primitive religions of which we know little more than what philologists read from a few words which have happened to be preserved to the present day. (p. 156) Max Müller thus gets only three groups of religions—the Turanian, Semitic and Aryan. Of the Turanians the Chinese is the earliest representative. (p. 193), "The popular worship of ancient China was a

worship of single spirits, of powers, or, we might almost say, of names; the names of the most prominent powers of nature which are supposed to exercise an influence for good or evil on the life of man. In addition to this, we likewise meet with the worship of ancestral spirits, the spirits of the departed, who are supposed to retain some cognisance of human affairs, etc. This double worship of human and of natural spirits constitutes the old popular religion of China, and it has lived on to the present day, at least in the lower ranks of society, though there towers above it a more elevated range of half-religious and half-philosophical faith, a belief in two higher Powers, which in the language of philosophy may mean Form and Matter, in the language of Ethics, Good and Evil, but which in the original language of religion and mythology are represented as Heaven and Earth." As the Chinese religion shall be treated in detail hereafter, I shall not make any comment upon it now. "The religion of the Semitic race (Max Müller says) including the polytheistic religions of the Babylonians, the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, as well as the monotheistic creeds of Jews, Christians and Mohammedans, was pre-eminently a worship of God in History, of God as affecting the destinies of individuals and races and nations rather than of God as wielding the powers of nature" (was that not the case also among the ancient Chinese? I shall give sufficient proofs that it was so). The ancient worship of the Aryan race he calls "a worship of God in Nature, of God as appearing behind the gorgeous veil of Nature, rather than as hidden behind the veil of the sanctuary of the human heart."

Mr. Fairbairn says (p. 20), "The Homeric Polytheism is successive, *i.e.* its gods have each a history and a place in a definite system; but the Vedic Polytheism is simultaneous, *i.e.* has no developed system—now one god, now another is supreme. The simultaneous is much more primitive than the successive stage. There has been time to create, not to systematize." I think no objection can be raised against both statements, but where lies the supposed distinction between the ancient Aryan and Turanian religions? The languages of the two branches on the other side differ so widely that the greatest linguists despair of ever finding a connecting link. If religion and language were so vitally connected in those early times, as Max Müller supposes, how is the above stated fact to be explained, how again could from one language (Semitic) religions be born so thoroughly different as those of the Phœnicians and the Jews, of the Pharisees and of Christ? And how is it possible that religions can be transplanted as Buddhism and Christianity have been, the first of Aryan origin finding acceptance and fuller development among Turanians, the other of Semitic birth among the Aryans? Max Müller will not be able to give a natural solution of these difficulties. His serious fault is, that he mistakes the early records of religion, records in the language of an early period, for the religion itself of that period.

Language has about the same relation to religion which it has to race. "And here we have to make the unreserved confession that the two do not by any means correspond and agree: wholly discordant lan-

guages are spoken by communities whom the ethnologist would not separate in race from one another; and related languages are spoken by men of apparently different race . . . there is no necessary tie between race and language; every man speaks the language he has learned, being born into the possession of no one rather than another; and, as any individual may learn a language different from that of his parents or of his remoter ancestors, so a community (which is only an aggregate of individuals) may do the same thing, not retaining the slightest trace of its ancestral speech. The world, past and present, is full of examples of this, of every class and kind . . . as the combination of heterogeneous elements, now using only English as their native tongue, found in the American community; the Celts of Gaul, the Normans of France, the Celts of Ireland and Cornwall, the Etruscans of Italy, and all the other communities whose idioms have been crowded out and replaced by the Latin, the English, the Arabic. There are conquering languages which are always encroaching upon the territory of their neighbours, as there are others which are always losing ground.

“The testimony of language to race is thus not that of a physical characteristic, nor of anything founded on and representing such; but only that of a transmitted institution, which, under sufficient inducement, is capable of being abandoned by its proper inheritors, or assumed by men of strange blood. And the inducement lies in external circumstances, not in the nature of the language abandoned or assumed. Political control, social superiority, superiority of culture—these are the leading causes which bring about change of speech. . .

“There is one more point calling for brief notice in connection with our classification of the dialects of the world. That classification aimed at being a strictly genetical one, each family embracing those tongues which, by the sum of all available evidences, were deemed traceable to a common ancestor. To the historical philologist, still deep in the labor of determining relations and tracing out the course of structural development, this is by far the most important of all; indeed, the value of any other at present is so small as to be hardly worthy of notice. The wider distinction of languages as isolating, agglutinative, and inflective, which has a degree of currency and familiarity, offers a convenient, but far from exact or absolute, test by which the character of linguistic structure may be tried; the three degrees lie in a certain line of progress, but, as in all such cases, pass into one another. To lay any stress upon this as a basis of classification is like making the character of the hair or the color of the skin a basis of classification in physical ethnology, or the number of stamens or the combination of leaves in botany: it ignores and overrides other distinctions of an equal or of greater importance. If the naturalist had the actual certainty which the linguist has of the common descent of related species, he would care little for any other classification, but would spend his strength upon the elaboration and perfection of this one. The linguist has enough of this still left to do; and till it is all accomplished, at any rate, any other is of small account to him.”*

* *The Life and Growth of Language*, by W. D. Whitney, p. 271, ff.

It seems rather strange, at first view, that a gene-tical classification of languages must differ from the ethnological classification of races. There can be no doubt that originally language and race must have coincided. Languages only branched off from their primitive stem after the formerly united races had become separated. If the separation had always been quite complete, we should at present find as many languages as races. But as different races and different languages came in contact with each other, became mixed and partly absorbed one by another, incalculable varieties have been produced. So it is with the genesis of religions. We may take it as unquestionable that originally each race had its peculiar form of religion as peculiar as its language. But the separation of religion and language may have become effected even sooner than that of language and races. We may find the proof in our present age. The English language, for example, is the medium of different Christian denominational dogmas, Jewish, Mahomedan and various polytheistic creeds, of atheists, materialists and pantheists, of sceptics and superstitious formalists. If in coming centuries a learned professor would make an attempt to write an outline of the *English Religion* from a newly discovered copy of Webster's dictionary, after all other religious records happened to be lost and forgotten, this professor would certainly produce a very learned and, perhaps, interesting work, and that English Religion may perhaps find, at such a time, as many scientific admirers as all the volumes on the Indo-European religion, on the Semitic religion, etc. find at present. My own unpretentious

opinion is, that such undertakings are of little value, as the result must be an abstract theory altogether different from real religious life.

To classify religions according to languages is as appropriate as to classify languages according to the length of tongues or shape of mouths, and plants according to the animals that live on them. All classification has to keep in its own sphere, has only to distinguish general and specific characteristics. Language is no characteristic feature of religion, but worship is, and the objects of worship, etc. are (see *Religion in Fact*). As I do not intend to write a work on comparative religion, but only on that of the Chinese, I have here nothing more to do with classification.

XIII.

TRUE RELIGION.

Max Müller says, (p. 261), "In one sense every religion was a true religion, being the only religion which was possible at the time, which was compatible with the language, the thoughts and sentiments of each generation, which was appropriate to the age of the world. I know full well," Max Müller continues, "the objections that will be made to this. Was the worship of Moloch, it will be said, a true religion when they burnt their sons and their daughters in the fire to their gods? Was the worship of Mylitta, or is the worship of Kâlî a true religion, when within the sanc-

tuary of their temples they committed abominations that must be nameless? Was the teaching of Buddha a true religion, when men were asked to believe that the highest reward of virtue and meditation consisted in a complete annihilation of the soul?

“Such arguments,” Max Müller continues, “may tell in party warfare, though even there they have provoked fearful retaliation. Can that be a true religion, it has been answered, which consigned men of holy innocence to the flames, because they held that the Son was like unto the Father but not the same as the Father, or because they would not worship the virgin and the Saints?”—Where does the Christian religion command or sanctify such things? Max Müller mistakes here human passion, party-spirit, a peculiar theology which inflamed the minds and hierarchic despotism for religion. If Christ and his apostles had given such examples or taught such doctrines Max Müller would be right, but as things stand Max Müller shows a great want of discernment really astonishing for a student of his accomplishments.

How different from Max Müller's view is what Mr. Thomas Dick says on the very same topic.

“What a dreadful picture would it present of the malignity of persons who have professed the religion of Christ, were we to collect into one point of view, all the persecutions, tortures, burnings, massacres, and horrid cruelties, which, in Europe, and Asia, and even in the West Indies and America, have been inflicted on conscientious men for their firm adherence to what they considered as the truths of religion! When we consider, on the one hand, the purity of morals, and

the purity of faith which generally distinguished the victims of persecution; and, on the other, the proud pampered priests, abandoned without shame to every species of wickedness, we can scarcely find words sufficiently strong to express the indignation and horror which arise in the mind, when it views this striking contrast and contemplates such scenes of impiety and crime. Could a religion, which breathes peace and good will from heaven towards men, be more basely misrepresented? or can the annals of our race present a more striking display of the perversity and depravity of mankind? To represent religion as consisting in the belief of certain incomprehensible dogmas, and to attempt to convert men to Christianity, and to inspire them with benevolence, by fire, and racks, and tortures, is as absurd as it is impious and profane; and represents the Divine Being as delighting in the torments and the death of sinners, rather than that they should return and live.”*

I think all my readers and, perhaps, Max Müller himself, if he should ever happen to see this, will fully agree with Mr. Dick’s excellent and fair judgment.

About Buddhism Max Müller’s Christian conscience compels him to confess (p. 242), “In no religion are we so constantly reminded of our own as in Buddhism, and yet in no religion has man been drawn away so far from the truth as in the religion of Buddha; Buddhism and Christianity are indeed the two opposite poles with regard to the most essential points of religion, Buddhism ignoring all feeling of dependence

* *The Philosophy of Religion*, Thomas Dick, LL.D., p. 172.

on a higher power, and therefore denying the very existence of a supreme Deity; Christianity resting entirely on a belief in God as the Father, in the Son of Man as the Son of God, and making us all children of God by faith in His Son." We have nothing to say against this statement.

Max Müller, however, goes on in his unjust strain (p. 262), "Can that be a true religion which screened the same nameless crimes behind the sacred walls of monasteries?" Max Müller means "immorality:" does the Christian religion approve such things? Max Müller doubtless knows it does not. If, however, corrupt persons seek to gratify their low passions under the shelter of a religious name—is that the fault of religion?

I take the liberty to confront Max Müller with another witness whose testimony is apparently free from any partiality in advocating Christianity. "There are also particular kinds both of virtue and of vice which appear prominently before the world, while others of at least equal influence almost escape the notice of history. Thus, for example, the sectarian animosities, the horrible persecutions, the blind hatred of progress, the ungenerous support of every galling disqualification and restraint, the intense class selfishness, the obstinately protracted defence of every intellectual and political superstition, the childish but whimsically ferocious quarrels about minute dogmatic distinctions, or dresses, or candlesticks, which constitute together the main features of ecclesiastical history, might naturally though very unjustly lead men to place the ecclesiastical type in almost the lowest rank, both intellectually and mo-

rally. These are, in fact, the displays of ecclesiastical influence which stand in bold relief in the pages of history. The civilising and moralising influence of the clergyman in his parish, the simple, unostentatious, unselfish zeal with which he educates the ignorant, guides the erring, comforts the sorrowing, braves the horrors of pestilence, and sheds a hallowing influence over the dying hour, the countless ways in which, in his little sphere, he allays evil passions, and softens manners, and elevates and purifies those around him—all these things, though very evident to the detailed observer, do not stand out in the same vivid prominence in historical records, and are continually forgotten by historians.”* Such facts cannot be altogether unknown to Max Müller, who betrays here perhaps more ill-temper than ill-judgment.

“Can that be a true religion,” Max Müller goes on, “which taught the eternity of punishment without any hope of pardon or salvation for the sinner, however penitent?” Max Müller is again in error; as *he* states the doctrine, it belongs to theology and not to religion. The Christian religion speaks of eternal punishment because there is no more a possibility of penitence and not in spite of it. The rich man’s complaint in hell was surely no repentance but continued excuse. Those who wish to save even “the poor devil,” ought to read Milton’s *Paradise Lost*. Milton himself was a strong character, and thus he was able to depict in Satan a real satanic character. Our modern sentimental writers, weak from book-dust and indigestion, do not any more

* *History of European Morals*, by W. E. H. Lecky, M.A., second ed., vol. I., p. 159, ff.

understand the real *power of will*. Max Müller ought to have seen that this "fearful retaliation" is altogether harmless except to bring ridicule on its inventor and tools. Nothing of that kind has ever been a worship to the Heavenly Father, the God of Christians, it proves, therefore, nothing for a worship of Moloch, of Mylitta, Kâlî, nor for the teachings of Buddha.

Bad religions are also not made better by calling what makes them bad the "inevitable excrescences" of all religions. We want to know whether the so-called excrescences are essential to a religion—a *worship*—or whether they were accidentally introduced in spite of religion, from other quarters, worldly motives, etc.

We partly agree with Max Müller, that religion has to accommodate itself to the intellectual capacities of those whom it is to influence. Accommodation to the intellectual capacities is necessary, but accommodation to perverse tendencies or passions is a religious crime. Where such perversities of the human soul are deified, or where they are sanctified by religious acts, there we have *false* religion. True religion teaches man to sanctify heart and body and make them the abode of the most holy Being, God. False religion allows the gratification of bad desires and deifies the natural tendencies of the human heart, makes idols. True religion reveals the ideals, the typical nature of man by which he is the image of the most perfect being. False religion leaves man in his corruption and rather helps to make him sink deeper; true religion will bring man towards accomplishing his ideals.

Max Müller now and then has a glimpse of the truth, (p. 263), he says, "the intention of religion (of

course true religion must be meant) wherever we meet it, is always holy ; it always represents the highest ideal of perfection which the human soul, for the time being, can reach and grasp." Of Greek religion we find (p. 355, ff., 339, ff.) an account rather in contradiction to the sense of the quoted passage. Common thinkers thus must draw the conclusion that Greek religion is a false religion.* We must also keep in mind that of most religions of ancient nations we only have some records, perhaps their sacred books, but we must take for granted that the practical religious life never has reached its professed standard. Of our Christian religion we see the practice imperfect and contradictory,†

* "The Roman religion, even in its best days, though an admirable system of moral discipline, was never an independent source of moral enthusiasm. It was the creature of the State, and derived its inspiration from political feeling. The Roman gods were not, like those of the Greeks, the creations of an unbridled and irreverent fancy, nor, like those of the Egyptians, representations of the forces of nature ; they were for the most part simple allegories, frigid personifications of different virtues, or presiding spirits imagined for the protection of different departments of industry. The religion established the sanctity of an oath, it gave a kind of official consecration to certain virtues, and commemorated special instances in which they had been displayed ; its local character strengthened patriotic feeling, its worship of the dead fostered a vague belief in the immortality of the soul, it sustained the supremacy of the father in the family, surrounded marriage with many imposing solemnities, and created simple and reverent characters profoundly submissive to an overruling Providence and scrupulously observant of sacred rites. But with all this it was purely selfish. It was simply a method of obtaining prosperity, averting calamity, and reading the future. Ancient Rome produced many heroes, but no saint. Its self-sacrifice was patriotic, not religious. Its religion was neither an independent teacher nor a source of inspiration, although its rites mingled with and strengthened some of the best habits of the people." *History of European Morals*, by W. E. H. Lecky, vol. I., p. 176, ff.

† We ought, moreover, to be careful in distinguishing between the Christian religion and Christians, as many so called

and too often the standard in the Holy Scriptures is forgotten. We also should not judge a whole nation after one man or a few writers; they may have been isolated in their views or may have been like the prophets among the people of Israel. Those who reach a relative perfection are but few, not only in religions, in arts, science, military skill, etc. as well. Most of the religions even point out the difference between the few true believers and the world around them. In times when religious feeling and conviction is most intense there will be caused the separation of a religious society from the secular, or at least of individuals from it. Though some may pursue a secular profession, yet they avoid any other intercourse with the world except the professional. The Science of comparative Religion ought to pay special attention to such phenomena of religious life. True religion has been too often not with the domineering and proud majority but among a despised minority, hidden from the eyes of the luxurious and profligated world.

True religion is sometimes misunderstood to mean *perfect religious life*. We have to distinguish between these two notions. Logic remains true even if all men should use argument illogically. A religion may be true even if all its followers are sinners against it. The Christian religion considers only one man as perfect, that is Jesus Christ; he, therefore, is the only Master to Christians. Other religions must be treated in a similar way.

“In tracing the religious instincts of humanity,”

Christians are not true adherents and even true adherents are only partly influenced by the genuine Christian spirit.

says a recent writer,* “we are tracing the working out of the law of its well-being. Wherever a religious instinct appears it must be noted, for it is the voice of the spiritual nature clamouring for food necessary for its life and perfection. Wherever a religious instinct leads awrong, it is not that the instinct is wrong, but that it runs counter to or overrides correlative instincts. When man has pursued one instinct across and athwart other instincts, which it tramples down in its fanaticism, he fails through exaggeration.

“Religious instincts resemble political instincts. Every form of government is based on a right principle, but where other and equally right principles have been overlooked, misery ensues. Political mistakes have their origin in a lack of knowledge. There were ten famines in France in one century; the country had bred soldiers, not farmers.

“When a religious instinct produces error—that is, when religion becomes superstition, there is something wrong in its organisation. There is an undue preponderance given to this truth, and there is a forgetfulness of that truth. Every phase of religion the world has yet seen has broken down through exaggeration of one truth at the expense of another. The history of religious experiments is exceedingly instructive, for it shows us, first, what are the religious instincts of humanity; and secondly, failure, through imperfect co-ordination of these instincts. A review of the religions of the world will show us of what nature that religion must be which alone will satisfy humanity—a religion

* *The Origin and Development of Religious Belief*, by S. Baring Gould, M. A., Part I., Heathenism and Mosaism, p. 53, ff.

in which those inherent tendencies of the mind and soul which produced Fetishism, Anthropomorphism, Polytheism, Monotheism, Spiritualism, Idealism, Positivism, will find their co-ordinate expression; a religion in which all the sacred systems of humanity may meet, as in a Field of the Cloth of Gold, to adorn it with their piety, their mysticism, their mythology, their subtlety of thought, their splendour of ceremonial, their adaptability to progress, their elasticity of organization—and, meeting, may exhaust their own resources—

By this to sicken their estates, that never
They shall abound as formerly (*Henry VIII.*, Act i. sc. 1.).”

This statement seems to imply that all actual religions are false, or, more correct, are imperfect because onesided. There is some truth in that, which is, however, often a cause of great error. Mr. Baring Gould does not say that he includes Christianity, but other writers do, for example S. Johnson.* I hope the pattern of the Romish Church is convincing to Mr. Baring Gould that Christianity is not improved by eclecticism from other sources. If the pope, however, were Christ in person, if the priests were angelic saints and the statutes not human ordinances but divine maxims, I myself should indeed join their church and recommend the same step to everybody. As things stand now I look with disgust on this motley of truth and errors and have nothing but pity for the slaves of such a system. If we speak of the Christian Religion we must take a distinct view of it. Not this church or

* *Oriental Religions and their Relation to Universal Religion*, Boston, 1873.

that one is the Christian religion, but *the idea Christ* himself gives of it, which is contained in the canon of the New Testament. This idea is working among the Christians, but has not yet found its full realization. In its completed development the Christian religion will contain in perfection what any religion of the world can boast of truth, divine or human instincts, etc. It is greatly to be regretted that only very few writers on religion have an idea of the idea of the Christian religion. We may, however, find many writers who have a pretty fair idea of Brahmanism, Buddhism and even Fetishism, and thus involuntarily misrepresent the relation of Christianity to those religions.

XIV.

THE DIVINE EDUCATION OF THE HUMAN RACE.

Max Müller complains (p. 223), and we with him, "that there are people who believe that all the nations of the earth, before the rise of Christianity, were mere outcasts, forsaken and forgotten of their Father in heaven, without a knowledge of God, without a hope of salvation." It is, however, going as much to the other side of the mistake to continue as Max Müller does,—“If a comparative study of the religions of the world produced but this one result, that it drove this godless heresy out of every Christian heart, and made us see again in the history of the world the

eternal wisdom and love of God towards all His creatures, it would have done a good work."

Yes, the eternal wisdom and love of God we ought to see in the history of the world, but our eyes must not be shut to the dark shades, to human sin, corruption and wickedness, even enmity against God. I agree with Max Müller and other writers that neither the art of ancient (and modern) nations, nor their poetry, nor their philosophy would have been possible without religion; that "there is no religion which does not contain some grains of truth," only some grains, alas! among heaps of sand and uncouth rubbish.

I must confess of myself that the history of the ancient religions has not enabled me to see therein "more clearly than anywhere else—the Divine education of the human race," nor do I know of any modern author who has seen it and could show it to his readers. A few high-sounding phrases one can meet here and there, but phrases cannot be accepted as proofs. Such Divine education as indicated by Max Müller would have to be pronounced an utter failure. None of those ancient religions has been developed to higher perfection and purity, but all have degenerated in the course of time. Though usually, some errors have become modified in later periods, other errors, perhaps more serious, have grown up. Yea, the noblest and purest religious ideas have in all religions—except the Christian—been neglected in the course of time, and superstitions and nonsense have grown up like weeds in a neglected field. Though I myself believe in a continuous Divine work among all men, yet I know besides, from my own experience, the great power of counterac-

tion in the natural heart of man, with its selfish, sensual and worldly propensities. Mythology has many elements of this kind. But what is said under the head "Religion and Mythology" may suffice for our purpose here.

The Divine Education of the human race is one of the most difficult subjects for a scholar to deal with. A good work of that kind would be a philosophy of history from the theosophic point of view. The writer must be imbued with the Spirit of God to understand the Divine plan, detect the Divine means employed and see their working to the end in spite of all obstructions and apparent frustrations by human obstinacy and perverseness.

Baron Bunsen is an authority highly respected by Max Müller, yet Max Müller never refers to his friend's work "God in History," which is, perhaps, the best attempt in the direction spoken of. Bunsen's own opinion about the writers on this subject before him may be seen in the following passage.* "Noble and enlightened minds have from early times sought to justify the Moral Order of the world, according to which all evil is self-destructive and is finally doomed to perish, but not until after apparent victory and lengthened domination; while the good prevails at last, but only after an arduous struggle, and often after a long period of misconception and oppression. This justification may either seek its ground in fact or in thought. The conception of the Divine Providence, as consistent with human conscience and reason, is presented among the Semitic peoples, in the history telling how,

* *God in History, or The Progress of Man's Faith in the Moral Order of the World*, by Baron Bunsen, Vol. I., p. 23, etc.

from Abraham to Moses, God delivered His people with a strong hand, and again in the book of Job, as the lesson of submission to His mighty arm. Among the Hellenes, the triumph of Divine Justice was celebrated in Epos and Drama. The exhibition of the Divine Nemesis in the destruction of Troy is the immortal type of the former kind, the epic Theodicy; the vivid representation of an avenging Fate in the tragedies of Æschylus and Sophocles is an equally immortal hymn to the moral order of the world. Finally, in the historical work of Herodotus, the same circle of ideas is exhibited in contrast with the actual destinies of nations and their leaders.

“ Leibnitz was the first to attempt a philosophical Theodicy. An attempt to reach the same goal by other paths was made by Lessing and Herder without a philosophical system, and by Kant, Schelling and Hegel, with one (p. 23, 24). Leibnitz not only recognized, like Bacon, what was wanted for historical science; he also laid the foundations of this science in all three departments, philological, historical, and speculative. Kant, however, set this problem still more definitely before himself, and endeavoured to solve it by means of his fundamental Theory of Ethics, starting from the political, cosmopolitan point of view, as Herder, in his ‘Ideas towards a Philosophy of the History of Mankind,’ started from the anthropological and humanitarian. Lessing’s scattered but pregnant hints first bore fruit in the writings of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Fichte, like a Titan, only touched history on her mountain summits, but Schelling’s mighty utterance in his ‘Orations on Academic Study,’ knit for ever the bond

between Idea and History. It is, however, generally acknowledged that Schelling occupied himself but little with the actual details of history, and not at all with the method of its organic connection with pure speculative thought. Hegel, on the other hand, has indeed contemplated such a method, but from the one-sided, logical point of view; he has linked the construction of scientific history to universal formulas, at which he arrived without paying due regard to the process of the mind's evolution in history" (p. 11).

The lessons of the Divine Education of the human race have yet to be found out. It is, without doubt, a most instructive work if executed in a devoted spirit. It would be at the same time a most heart-refreshing thing and give highest satisfaction to the mind. The great danger, however, is that most of the writers will begin with their own metaphysics and *a priori* construction, which is worse than a mere relation of facts. The safest way certainly is to begin with an investigation into all traces of this kind found in the literature of different nations. The Chinese will contribute not a small share. We shall see that the Chinese have especially "the moral order" in view as the Divine plan. The education of man consists in Heaven's dealing with them in a way that they feel happy and flourishing when agreeing with the moral order, but calamity and destruction surely comes over them as soon as the moral order is disturbed. For moral causes are believed to produce physical effects.

Another idea connected with the Divine plan is the most perfect development of Heaven-conferred human nature, etc. We, in comparing from our point of

view the Chinese nation with other nations, would find the good they have developed for the benefit of many other races in their state-organism. Politics and laws are founded on ethics, ethics again on the typical human nature. Whether China has fulfilled her task in the Divine plan or not we cannot yet tell; it may, however, soon become apparent.

The Divine education is most conspicuous in the history of the Jews. Abraham, the great ancestor of the nation, was singled out from his relationship and had to become a stranger in Canaan. There he was taught to believe without seeing. His seed had to go to Egypt to school, got lessons of discipline, etc. under the summit of Sinai, then in possession of the promised land, other important lessons began, which the nation as such proved unable to master. Only a few out of the great number of the Jewish people were sufficiently prepared to appreciate the person of the Messiah and accept his new covenant. Yet to this Messiah and to the Kingdom of God approaching in his person the whole plan of divine education had its climax for the Jewish race.

My meaning will be already clear enough against Max Müller's sentiment. Not the peculiarity of Chinese seclusion, nor of Jewish Bigotry and Pharisaism show the Divine education of those races, but what has been done by them towards perfecting human nature, human society and especially human relation to God.

Another feature of the Divine education of the human race is that God allows men to develop some peculiarity of their own to the extreme in order to break down such artificial edifices. We know the

extreme monotheistic formalism and sacerdotalism of the Jews in the time of Jesus. It had to be broken down by force of heathen soldiers. Only the Spirit of the old covenant went into the new Christian communion. The Greeks were so wise in their own opinion that they regarded all other nations as barbarians, yet simple fishermen from Galilee and a tent-maker from Asia Minor had to teach them true wisdom. The Romans had excellent laws, yet became a most lawless people, and the rude Teutonic tribes were used to humble them. The Teutonic tribes crushed the more civilised Roman Empire, yet they themselves became the propagators of Roman and Greek civilization. The degenerated Christian orientals had to be taught first lessons again by the Mohamedans. The Saracens brought not only their strict monotheism as an improvement for worship or better named perhaps, idolatry of pictures, but also sciences and arts to Europe. By the fall of Constantinople the hidden Greek culture became scattered over Europe, etc. In our present time we see how the Divine education brings all nations and tribes of the whole Earth in contact with each other. Every achievement, bad as well as good, is made a common inheritance to the whole human race.

CONCLUSION.

The contents of the fourteen chapters given above show, I hope, incontestibly the great extent and power of religion. Though I could not spend so much time on the subject as it is worth, the reader will probably get the impression that the treatment has been both penetrating and comprehensive. If I cared to give more colour to the pages the effect would be increased, but I do not intend to present to the public a painting but only a drawing, perhaps even nothing but a sketch. Such sketches are useful in many respects. If we have beforehand an idea of the field we intend to enter we may save ourselves from much rambling. If investigation is well directed it may accomplish great results. My sketch will be of service in this respect not only to Missionaries in the field but to all who take a scientific interest in religion. I hope, however, that even those well enough educated persons who devote themselves chiefly to the practical side of religion will derive some profit from any attention they pay to the questions touched in my little book.

I have already gathered materials for writing on the Chinese religion. If God spares life and strength I hope to carry out my plan as exactly as possible. The undertaking is surrounded with many difficulties, as the greatest portion of the literature that must be treated is not yet translated. It takes much time to wade through old Chinese works. Yet the important thing is to use originals as far as they go and not secondary writers. But even if I should feel unable to accomplish the work, the plan here given will enable other students to go on with it.

A treatment of comparative religion executed as comprehensively as sketched above is not yet possible, as too much preliminary work has to be done beforehand. If, however, a number of scholars would direct their labours towards it we might see something of the kind in a few years. The advantage gained will be immense. I anticipate this not only for the science of religion and for other sciences connected with it, but especially for our practical religious convictions. I do not believe that any science can give a new basis to religious belief, but some sciences do their best to disturb the harmonious peace of religious life at present. A proper, *i.e.* congenial, scientific treatment of comparative religion must of necessity put a stop to such disturbances. This is one great advantage. Another is the removal of some gross prejudices. Many scientific men and other persons boasting themselves of a higher education are accustomed to look down upon religion as below their accomplishments. They may learn that a man with the lowest form of religion is above one who has none at all. Not the least ad-

vantage derived from an exhaustive treatment of the Science of Religion is a deeper understanding of the last commandment of our Lord Jesus regarding the Christian Mission to all nations and tribes. We shall see in it really one of the manifestations of Divine love towards all men. May we more and more succeed to be influenced only by this Divine agency and not by worldly motives or human passion, and may we see more of its realization in the spheres of our labour!

Religion is the life of Eternity in midst of the transitory scenes of this world. If our work has something in it of the true religious spirit it will in so far outlive the perishableness of other things—*it is done for Eternity.*

REV. ERNST FABER'S WORKS.


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